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NOTE
CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCES: POLICE
CONTROL OVER POTENTIAL RECIDIVISTS*
During the past twenty years, the enactment and administration of
the body of laws known as "criminal registration ordinances" have intro-
duced an intriguing and important development in the control of criminal
activity. In general, these ordinances require certain persons in the juris-
diction who have been convicted of enumerated crimes to register with
the local police officials and to furnish them with certain data regarding
their prior criminal history and present activities.1 In their purpose and
scope the ordinances are separate and distinguishable from probation and
parole laws. Under the latter, a convicted person undergoes surveillance
in lieu of incarceration, 2 whereas the criminal registration ordinances gen-
erally require registration irrespective of the parole, probation or past
incarceration of the convicted person. In theory, the probation and parole
laws have been devised to rehabilitate the individual,3 while criminal regis-
tration laws are an attempt to aid law enforcement agencies in the pre-
vention and detection of the individual's recidivistic behavior. The crim-
inal registration laws are also separate and distinct from "workers' regis-
tration laws," which require a person to register with local authorities
before engaging in enumerated types of employment.4  This Note treats
workers' registration only to show its conjunctive use with the criminal
registration ordinances.
The efficacy and social desirability of criminal registration is a matter
of controversy 6 The purpose of this Note is to determine (1) the preva-
* The research for this Note was financed by funds granted to the University
of Pennsylvania Law School for studies on Law Enforcement and Individual Liberty.
Jacob Kossman, Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar, has established a fund for this purpose
in memory of the late Justice Wiley Rutledge.
The Law Review wishes to express its appreciation for the generous cooperation
of the various police officials, officers, and others whose assistance was of great
value.
1. The registration requirements and process are described more fully in text at
note 82 et seq. and text preceding and following note 151 infra.
2. See, e.g., BARNES AND TEaeRas, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 382, 814
(rev. ed. 1949).
3. Id. at 373, 826-28.
4. See text at note 23 and note 23 infra.
5. For example, Mr. Buron Fitts, former District Attorney of Los Angeles,
California, and co-author of that city's ordinance stated in a letter of January 5,
1954: "I can say that since the day of its enactment to the date of my departure
from office the ordinance was indeed effective. It consists of secret information and
establishes a file of great use to law enforcement agencies without harm to the
individual in view of its secrecy. It has since been amended to provide the inclusion
of sex perverts and offenders against children."
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lence of these ordinances; (2) the persons subjected to them; (3) the
duties imposed on the persons affected; (4) the resulting penalties or
dangers to these persons; (5) the various methods of administering the
ordinances; (6) the degree to which the ordinances achieve their pur-
poses; and (7) the constitutionality of the ordinances.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the early nineteen-thirties significant segments of the American
public became alarmed at an apparently increasing rate of professional
criminality.6 Legislative action to meet the new menace was said to be
imperative; 7 and a federal investigating committee scoured the country for
information which could form the basis for a national legislative solution.8
In addition, state criminal laws were generally re-examined. In several
instances penalties were increased, habitual and multiple offender laws
were enacted and other new legislation was passed to meet the criminal
On the other hand, Mr. Leroy J. Contie, Jr., City Solicitor of Canton, Ohio,
stated in a letter of November 25, 1953: "We have made two arrests over a period
of two years relating to failure to register under our criminal registration ordi-
nance. . . . I, personally, am not in sympathy with our ordinance as it is impossible
to administer and it has only been used in isolated cases to eliminate an undesirable in-
dividual coming into the community. There are those individuals who label our ordi-
nance as 'Jean Val Jean legislation' I am of the opinion that even though such legis-
lation may be of value in checking upon hardened criminals, that it works a definite
hardship on an individual who has paid his debt to society and is attempting to
rehabilitate himself."
These and all other communications cited in this Note were sent to the UNI-
VERsITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REviEv and are on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
6. See Hearings Before Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce pursuant
to S. Res. 74, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 145, 629-33, 155 (1933); People v. Stein, 265
Mich. 610, 616, 251 N.W. 788, 790 (1933) (dissenting opinion). It is difficult to
determine the validity of the popular belief that professional criminality was in-
creasing and there is some evidence that the total crime rate was actually decreasing
during the early thirties. Chicago Police Problems, 25 J. CRrm. L. & CRImINOLOGY
168 (1934) (report of the Institute of Public Administration) (two and one-half
year downward trend in Chicago crime). See also, Current Note, Baltimore Report,
23 J. CIuo:. L. & CmiMNOLorY 498 (1932) (number of serious crimes in first
quarter of 1932 lower than in any corresponding period since 1924 with exception
of 1930); Current Note, Philadelphia Report, 23 J. CRIn. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 499
(1932) (less crime in first quarter of 1932 than in any quarter in 1931).
7. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 99-100, 117, 136-37, 139, 182, 183, 185.
8. SEN. REs. No. 74, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), created the committee headed
by Senator Copeland.
The extreme proposals offered by witnesses before the Copeland committee serve
to illustrate the tenor of the period. For example, there were suggestions for consti-
tutional amendments which would have permitted a national vagrancy act under
which the burden would have been upon the accused to prove that he was earning
an honest living and which would have sanctioned unlimited search and seizure of
anyone reputed to be carrying firearms in violation of the law. Hearings, supra
note 6, at 135, 307. See also Note, Some Recent Methods of Harassing the Habitual
Crminal, 16 ST. Louis L. Rav, 148, 162 (1931), in which it is reported that Wiley
B. Rutledge, then Dean of the Washington University School of Law at St. Louis
and later a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, advocated the establishment
of a commission with certain safeguards having the power to convict persons as
public enemies and fix terms of their removal from society without the necessity of
a conviction for a specific offense as required at common law.
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activity of that time.9 A few of the new laws in effect punished persons
for being "criminals." For example, Illinois amended its Vagabond Law
to punish persons "reputed to be habitual violators of criminal laws . . ."
and "associates, companions, or bodyguards of such persons . -;10
New Jersey, on the other hand, adopted a law to imprison "gangsters,"
defining gangster as any unemployed, previously-convicted person "known
to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons... ." 11
These statutes, however, were declared unconstitutional. 2  Some juris-
dictions used their existing vagrancy laws to harass the gangsters and
racketeers.'3
This activity formed the background in which the criminal registration
ordinances had their inception. 14 Many felt that these ordinances would
be effective because criminals 15 would be harassed by the information
requirements and convictions could be obtained merely by showing pres-
ence within the jurisdiction, a criminal record and failure to register.
The burden of proving a criminal reputation or no visible means of sup-
port, as required by the vagrancy and "gangster" laws,'6 was no longer an
obstacle.
9. See Chamberlain: Criminal Legislation of 1931, 18 A.B.A.J. 167-71, 204-05
(1932) ; Criminal Statutes for 1932, 19 A.B.A.J. 181-85 (1933); Criminal Legislation
of 1933, 20 A.B.A.J. 219-21 (1934).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 578 (1933).
11. LAWS OF NEW JERSEY c. 155, §4 (1934).
12. People v. Belcastro, 356 Il1. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934) ; Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). A similar law in Michigan was held unconstitutional
in People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643, 250 N.W. 520 (1933). This law, known as the
"public enemy" law provided that: "Any person who engages in an illegal occupation
or business . . . shall be deemed a disorderly person. Proof of recent reputation
for engaging in an illegal occupation or business shall be prima facie evidence of being
engaged in an illegal occupation or business." MicH. STAT. ANN. §28.364 (1938).
13. See Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Persoal Condition, 66 HAmv.
L. REv. 1203, 1218 (1953). The activity of the Chicago police in this respect was
widely publicized. Note, Some Recent Methods of Harassing The Habitual Criminal,
16 ST. Louis L. REv. 148, 153 (1931) ; Note, Use of Vagrancy-type Laws for Arrest
and Detention of Sutspicious Persons, 59 YAL.E L.J. 1351 (1950) ;. Crowley, Observa-
tions on American Police Systems, 20 J. CRim. L. & CRImiNOLOGY 167, 169 (1929).
Although in many cases these criminals were quite affluent, they still were subjected
to arrest as vagrants without visible means of support. The Chicago police attempted
to hold one such "vagrant" in $50,000 bail but on appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois
reduced it to $5,000. People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8
(1930). A 1933 newspaper article describes a police raid in New York City in which
one Michail Coppola was arrested as a vagrant under § 1722 of the New York
Penal Code. The article states that when the suspect was told of the nature of
the charge he withdrew a roll of bills amounting to $800 from his pocket and asked,
"Did you ever see a vagrant with that much cash?" N.Y. Times, June 13, 1933,
p. 40, cols. 5-6. See also statement by Fiorello La Guardia, then Mayor of New
York City, in N.Y. Times, April 19, 1939, p. 25, col. 5.
14. Criminal registration ordinances first appeared in the United States in 1933
when Los Angeles (see N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1933, p. 20, col. 2), Arcadia and South
Gate, California; and Miami Beach and Coral Gables, Florida, enacted their ordi-
nances. See Appendix B infra.
15. A "criminal" or a "convicted person" as used throughout this Note will refer
to a person who has previously been convicted of a crime enumerated in a criminal
registration ordinance, but who is not necessarily presently engaged in criminal ac-
tivity.
16. See Lacey, supra note 13, at 1213.
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The immediate objectives of these ordinances appeared to be the
incarceration or expulsion of undesirables, rather than the registration of
criminals.17 It was believed that the individuals affected would move
elsewhere to avoid registration.'8  However, as more jurisdictions adopted
these ordinances, a convicted person would be less able and less likely
to escape registration by moving. Therefore, the. principal mode of
evasion would tend to become a failure to register with the consequent
fulfillment of only the incarceration objective. A subordinate objective to
incarceration or expulsion was temporary detention. One chief of de-
tectives observed that his force, while not particularly interested in prose-
cuting non-registrants, is interested in having the ordinance available to
hold such individuals temporarily for questioning, and is "very well pleased
with the results brought about by the enactment of this Ordinance." 19
Other supporters of the ordinances apparently felt that the registration
data would be of substantial practical use to law enforcement agencies in
locating and following the activities of probable recidivists. 20  In fact,
universal registration and fingerprinting have been advocated,21 though
17. Referring to the adoption of the Los Angeles, California, ordinance, it was
reported that: "District Attorney Buron Fitts and Robert P. Stewart, chief deputy
district attorney, who framed the legislation, and Chief of Police James Davis, one
of its chief supporters, declare, however, that the very fact that dangerous ex-convicts
will not register is the strength of the law.
"'In the past,' says Chief Davis, 'after every major crime we have picked up
many suspects with criminal records. In some of these cases we have been sure that
we had in custody the guilty men, but we often lacked legal proof to convict. Under
the new registration laws, each of these men can now be dealt with not for the crime
suspected, but for failing to register. .. .'
"The police department's gangster detail, The Times [Los Angeles] tells us,
reports that Eastern gangsters are leaving the city, and that Los Angeles has been
tagged in the underworld as 'hot.'" The Literary Digest, Sept. 30, 1933, p. 39,
cols. 1, 2.
The Birmingham, Alabama, ordinance was expected to result "in an exodus of
a great number of known criminals." N.Y. Times, July 4, 1935, p. 16, col. 2.
The objective of having undesirables move to other areas is also achieved in
some localities by conditioning probation of persons convicted of violating the ordi-
nance upon their leaving the jurisdiction. See text at and following note 170 infra.
Certain groups who were opposed to the ordinances also assumed that those
persons engaged in criminal activity would not register. See Current Note, Criminal
Registration Law, 27 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 296 (1936).
18. See note 17 supra.
19. Letter from Dan B. Hudson, Chief of Detectives, Evansville, Indiana (Oct.
31, 1953) (Evansville adopted its ordinance during the early part of 1953). See also
statement of James Davis, Chief of Police, Los Angeles, California, quoted in note
17 supra.
20. See letter from Mr. Buron Fitts, supra note 5. See also Criminal Statistics
and Identification of Criminals, 19 J. CRIm. L. & CRImiNOLOGY 36, 43 et seq. (1928).
21. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1934, p. 2, col. 4 (the executive committee of the
Chamber of Commerce of New York). See also article by J. Edgar Hoover in 50
ROTARIAN 16 (Jan. 1937) ; Professor August Vollmer of the University of California,
in advocating a universal registration system, listed over one hundred advantages
of such a system. Current Note, Universal Registratio=, 25 J. CRIm. L. & CRImI-
NOLOGY 650 (1935). See 51 Am. CITy 99 (April 1936) (citing the official publication
of the United States Conference of Mayors). In 1941, bills were introduced in the
House of Representatives which would have required all residents of the
United States over 16 years of age to register and be fingerprinted. Current Note,
Bills in Congress re Fingerprinting, 32 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 656 (1942). Many
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never adopted,2 2 as an aid to law enforcement officials; and many localities
require the registration and fingerprinting of certain employees and other
segments of society.P To those who advocated universal registration and
fingerprinting the criminal registration ordinances were a significant step
toward that goal.
Finally, there apparently were a few who were motivated by a belief
that any regimentation of the masses, and particularly of those who had
previously demonstrated a criminal tendency, was a desirable end in itself.
As one Philadelphia detective stated, he favored the criminal registration
ordinances because it led the "criminals" to believe that they were under
the surveillance of the police department. The registrant's feeling of con-
stant surveillance and obligation to notify the police of any change of
address might impose some regimentation upon the criminals.
24
government officials and other persons suggested some form of universal registration
and fingerprinting to the Copeland committee. Hearings, supra note 6, at 11, 171,
286, 290, 337, 344, 394, 443. In 1935, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover stated that "fingerprint-
ing is of potential value to every citizen. . . ." and announced that the FBI would
supply local school boards with supplies to fingerprint the students. Hoover,
Fingerprinting School Children, 21 SCHOOL LIFE 2 (1935).
22. Although universal registration and fingerprinting laws are not found in the
United States, they do exist in South America and Europe. For a complete descrip-
tion of a few of these registration systems and an appreciation of their thoroughness,
see 75 BULL. OF THE PAN AM. UNION 374 (1941) (Dominican Republic); White,
Indexed Fingers, 2 THE INThR-Am-RIcAN 27 (Dec. 1943) (Chile); Kempner, The
German National Registration System as Means of Police Control of Population,
36 J. ClMi. L. & CmmiNOLoGY 362 (1946).
23. The Miami Beach, Florida, workers' registration ordinance requires prac-
tically every employed person to register within 48 hours of the time of employment
and pay a $1.00 fee. Lakewood and Atlantic City, New Jersey, require the regis-
tration and fingerprinting of non-resident employees; Las Vegas, Nevada, requires
the registration of "all employees of gambling houses, taxi drivers, and employees
of establishments where alcoholic beverages are sold at retail and served on the
premises. . .. " Ordinances requiring taxi cab drivers to register with the police
and to be fingerprinted, photographed and to furnish information regarding any past
criminal record are quite common. Such an ordinance was upheld on its face in
Walton v. City of Atlanta, 181 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823
(1950). See also Norman v. Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947) (liquor
employees' registration ordinance held constitutional). In 1936 Berkeley, California,
attempted to fingerprint the city's entire population. See Fingerprints of Fascism,
The New Republic, June 10, 1936, p. 118, col. 1.
24. A few instances demonstrated that some people actually feel that the police
have them under constant surveillance. In one case a Negro woman came into the
Identification Division of the Philadelphia Police Department to report that she
was leaving the city for four days to attend her mother's funeral and wanted to
notify the police so that she would not be in trouble when she returned. Many
registrants are told to keep the police informed of any new adresses, but no cases
were observed in which a person reported a new address. One individual reported
that he had lost his registration card and had come to the police right away because
he did not want to get into trouble.
Those opposed to the ordinance also evidently considered this aspect. "A more
important objection . . . is the psychic effect which it has on every man who has
committed a crime. It opens up old sores. It re-affirms the conviction which exists
in the minds of too many of these people that the police are anxious to get something
on them. The fact that this is not so does not matter. The important thing is that
this group of individuals feels that it is so." Current Note, Criminal Registration
Law, 27 J. Camr. L. & CRimINOLoGy 295, 295-96 (1936).
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THE PREVALENCE OF CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCES
Of the 246 localities which responded to this survey 25 forty-seven
have criminal registration ordinances.2 6 Analysis of the geographical dis-
tribution shows that about 80% of these localities which have ordinances
are situated in five relatively compact regions.2 7 One explanation for this
concentration may be that when one locality adopts such an ordinance the
surrounding localities usually follow suit. The remaining nine localities
which reported ordinances are scattered throughout the United States,
but no ordinances were found in the northeast section of the country.
Five states have enacted criminal registration statutes,28 which are more
narrowly drawn than are the local ordinances. Four of these states are
located in the five regions in which the local ordinances are concentrated.
THE ORDINANCES ANALYZED
2 9
Persons Required to Register
Conviction Required: Conviction of a crime, rather than mere arrest
or indictment, is the requisite for registration liability under all the
25. Questionnaires were sent to 406 cities which were chosen primarily on the
basis of population and geographic location, although certain localities were chosen
because they were resorts, located near race tracks or near a larger city which had
an ordinance. Appendix A more fully describes the scope of this survey.
26. The West Palm Beach, Florida, ordinance was reportedly declared invalid,
but details are unavailable. The Tampa, Florida, ordinance expired of its own
limitation. See Appendix B infra.
Lexington, Kentucky, reported that it did not have a criminal registration
ordinance, "but one is being formulated and is to be incoporated in our forthcoming
revised Criminal Code." Letter from E. C. Hale, Chief of Police, Lexington, Ken-
tucky (March 22, 1954). Minneapolis, Minnesota, reported that its city council
did not pass a proposed ordinance; Portland, Oregon, reported that it would welcome
an ordinance. Fairmount, Minnesota, reported that it is endeavoring to pass such
an ordinance.
27. These five regions and the approximate percentage of the 47 ordinances
which each region has are as follows: (1) the west coast of California from San
Francisco to San Diego-21%; (2) a belt approximately seventy miles wide and 350
miles long from Cleveland, Ohio, to Evansville, Indiana-19%; (3) eastern Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey-19%; (4) Florida-15%; and (5) southeastern Minnesota-
9%.
28. The five states are: Arizona-ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-6117 (Cum. Supp. 1951);
California-CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (Deering 1949) ; Illinois-ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38,
§ 192.29 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1953); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:169A-1 el seq. (1953); and Florida-Chapter 28470 Laws of Florida, 1953
(applies to counties with populations of 450,000 or more). The previous Florida
statute applied to counties with populations of over 150,000.
29. Of the 47 localities which have criminal registration ordinances, 41 submitted
copies of their ordinances to the Law Review for this study. The following analysis
is based primarily on a study of these 41 ordinances and the ordinance of Akron,
Ohio, although, in certain instances, the statutes of California, Florida, Illinois and
Arizona are also considered. Except where otherwise specified, the Camden,
New Jersey, ordinance which is discussed throughout this Note is that which was
adopted in 1934, as amended in 1935. As of the completion of the writing of this
Note, the Camden ordinance was in the process of being amended.
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1
ordinances. 30 It is well established in analogous fields that a requirement
of a prior "conviction" will be satisfied by judgments resulting from pleas
of guilty,31 nolo contendere,3 2 or non 7ndt; - on the other hand, pending
appeal 34 or after reversal 3 5 of a trial court's verdict of guilty an individual
will not be considered as having been "convicted." Under the criminal
registration ordinances, however, it is not clear whether an individual
would be deemed a "convicted" person pending appeal or after reversal
of his conviction. The lack of clarity in this area can produce unjust
applications of the registration requirement. Since most ordinances re-
quire registered persons to notify the police of their movements, it is pos-
sible that a registered individual, although no longer under the liability to
register, must nevertheless continue to observe the requirements of notifi-
cation because of the lack of a procedure to remove his registration.3 6
Generally, one conviction of any of the enumerated offenses is suffi-
cient to require registration. The only exceptions are the ordinances of
30. The Canton, Ohio, ordinance also provides that any person who "shall have
pleaded guilty to" the enumerated offenses shall be required to register. Shaker
Heights and Springfield, Ohio, have similar provisions as does the Florida statute,
Chapter 28470, Laws of Florida 1953.
31. People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 140 P.2d 828 (1943) (statute authorizing im-
peachment of witness by showing prior conviction); Clinton v. State, 143 Fla. 356,
196 So. 684 (1940) (prior offender statute); State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171
P.2d 383 (1946) (prior offender statute); Schooley v. United States, 4 F.2d 767
(8th Cir. 1925) (judgment must follow the guilty plea for it to be considered a
prior conviction within the meaning of multiple offender statutes) ; People v. Adams,
95 Mich. 541, 55 N.W. 461 (1893) (prior offender statute).
32. United States v. Dasher, 51 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (plea of nolo
contendere sufficient to charge accused as second offender under Fair Labor Standards
Act) ; State v. Suick, 195 Wis. 175, 217 N.W. 743 (1928) (plea of nolo contendere
sufficient to subject defendant to second offender provision). See also Note, 152
A.L.R. 253, 290 (1944).
33. People v. Daiboch, 265 N.Y. 125, 191 N.E. 859 (1934), reversing 240 App.
Div. 153, 269 N.Y. Supp. 321 (1st Dep't 1934) (plea of non mdlt sufficient to subject
defendant to second offender provision).
34. The analogous cases in this area involve the multiple offender statutes.
Nelson v. State, 116 Neb. 219, 216 N.W. 556 (1927) ; State v. Zounick, 133 Wash.
638, 234 Pac. 659 (1925); McAlester v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 70, 180 Pac. 718
(1919). See Morse v. State, 63 Okla. Crim. 445, 455, 77 P.2d 757, 762 (1938);
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363, 365, 73 Atl. 427, 428 (1909) (motion for
arrest of judgment pending). Contra: People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, 209 N.W.
110 (1926). See also Note, 5 A.L.R.2d 1092-97 (1949). Where the use of the
prior conviction is for impeachment purposes, an individual is considered "convicted"
immediately after the verdict of guilty, although an appeal may be taken. People v.
Clapp, 67 Cal.App.2d 197, 153 P.2d 758 (1944) ; Hackett v. Freeman, 103 Iowa 296,
72 N.W. 528 (1897). A conviction which is on appeal is not grounds for divorce.
Rivers v. Rivers, 60 Iowa 378, 14 N.W. 774 (1883).
35. Juskulski v. State, 206 Ind. 503, 190 N.E. 423 (1934) (habitual criminal law);
People v. Van Zile, 80 Misc. 329, 141 N.Y. Supp. 168 (1913) (use of prior conviction
for impeachment purposes); Brittian v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 491, 214 S.W. 351
(1919) (prior conviction provision).
36. In Philadelphia, one man was observed as he requested the officer in charge
to cancel his registration. According to the man, he had been advised by his
attorney to register after conviction in the trial court, but before an appeal had been
taken. On appeal, the conviction was reversed. The officer told the man that he
did not have the authority to remove his registration card from the files. Since this
was the individual's only "conviction," it would appear that he was n,- longer under
a liability to register, but, having previously registered, it is probable that he had to
continue compliance with the other requirements of the ordinance.
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Lorain, Cincinnati, and Columbus, Ohio, which require two prior felony
convictions. An even more satisfactory provision would be one which
correlates the multiplicity of prior convictions with the character of offenses
committed, but none of the ordinances examined employ such a standard.
Nature of the Crime Previously Committed: Since the apparent ob-
jective of the ordinances is to secure the registration of recidivists, one
would expect the registration liability to be confined to recidivistic crimes.
The state legislation, with the exception of that, of Florida,3 7 is focused
at specific purportedly recidivistic crimes. California and Arizona require
certain sex criminals to register, while Illinois and New Jersey require
the registration of narcotic offenders38 However, none of the local ordi-
nances are specifically aimed at recidivistic crimes. For example, Atlantic
City and Lakewood, New Jersey, require all persons convicted of any
crime to register. Fifteen jurisdictions limit registration to those who
have committed felonies,39 while a few ordinances limit registration to
persons convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude.40 Other juris-
37. The present Florida statute requires the registration of persons who have
been convicted of a felony. Chapter 28470, Laws of Florida 1953, § 1. The original
statute, however, provided that any person who had been convicted of a "felony
involving moral turpitude" was required to register. Chapter 18107, Laws of
Florida 1937, § 2.
38. See note 28 supra. Narcotic offenders are generally recidivistic in that the
addict by definition is engaged in a course of repetitious behavior and those engaged
in selling narcotics are predominantly either professionals or addicts. But authorities
agree that recidivism among sex criminals is negligible. For example, a study of
recidivism among sex criminals in New York City shows that: "First offenders
commit most sex crimes. . . . [O]f sex offenders convicted in the County Courts
and the Court of General Sessions [for decade 1930-1939] 61% had no record.
Where sex offenders do have prior criminal records, it is usually for non-sexual
crimes. . . . Police department fingerprint records disclose that only 79 of the
persons convicted of sex crimes in 1930 were again arrested on charges of sex crime
during the period from 1930 to 1941." MAYOR!S COMMITTEE FOR STUDY Or SEX
OFFENSES 11 (1943). The Commission on the Habitual Sex Offender of the New
Jersey State Legislature in 1950 reported that: "Sex offenders have one of the
lowest rates as 'repeaters' of all types of crime . . . [A]mong serious crimes homi-
cide alone has a lower rate of recidivism." See TAPFAN, TxarE HABITUAL SEx
OFFENDER: REPORT AND REcOmMENDATIONS OF THE COMISSION ON THE HABITUAL
SEx OFFENDER, NEW JERSEY STATE LEGISLATURE 14 (1950).
39. Cincinnati, Columbus and Lorain, Ohio; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Nor-
folk, Virginia; Seattle, Washington; Akron, Ohio; Birmingham, Alabama; Fort
Lauderdale, Miami, and Miami Beach, Florida; Long Beach, California; Rochester,
Minnesota (any crime other than a misdemeanor) ; St. Paul, Minnesota (any crime
other than a misdemeanor) ; and the Florida state statute.
In New Jersey most crimes are classified as a misdemeanor punishable with up
to seven years imprisonment. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:85-6, 2-A:85-7 (1953);
Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 42 Atl. 811 (1899). Apparently persons convicted
of such misdemeanors in New Jersey would not be required to register under the
last nine ordinances listed above, even though such persons may have served a seven-
year term; they would have to register, however, under the first six listed ordinances
which have provisions similar to the one found in text at note 49 infra.
40. E.g., Lakeland, Florida, and Hot Springs, Arkansas. These ordinances define
a felony involving moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or- to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man, and shall include among felonies any of the offenses known as grand larceny,
grand embezzlement, highway robbery, burglary, arson, rape, kidnapping, murder,
theft, wiretapping, and conspiracies involving confidence games."
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dictions avoid a general classification and merely enumerate certain offenses
as requiring registration; 41 however, some of these localities seem com-
pletely oblivious of the purported purpose of the ordinances (registering
recidivists) by requiring the registration of persons convicted of such non-
repetitious crimes as abduction of a woman for marriage 2 and misce-
genation.4 At the same time many localities which enumerate the crimes
fail to require the registration of those persons convicted of attempting,
44
conspiring,45 or being an accessory 46 to the commission of recidivistic
crimes. The Philadelphia ordinance not only enumerates specific offenses
but also requires the registration of those persons who, within ten years,
have either served any part of a sentence in a penitentiary-type penal
institution or who have served any part of a sentence of imprisonment
for two years or more in any public prison.47 The Reno, Nevada, ordi-
nance is unusual in that it not only includes all crimes that would be a
felony if committed in Nevada, but also any crime which if committed in
Nevada would be a violation of specified sections of the Nevada Criminal
Code.
48
Some of the ordinances provide that a conviction for an offense will
impose a liability to register not only (1) if the convicting jurisdiction's
designation (e.g., burglary) or classification (e.g., felony) of that offense
is the same designation or classification found in the registration ordinance,
but (2) if the designation or classification of that offense would have been
the same as that of the registration ordinance had it been committed in
the registering jurisdiction.49 For example, if a person is convicted in
State X of an offense which X characterizes as a misdemeanor, but State
Y characterizes the same offense as a felony, upon entering a locality in
" which has an ordinance requiring the registration of persons who have
been convicted of a felony or of an offense which if committed in State Y
would have been a felony, the person will have to register; if, on the other
41. Allentown and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Arcadia and South Gate, Cali-
fornia; Canton, Shaker Heights and Springfield, Ohio; Coral Gables, Pensacola and
St. Petersburg, Florida; Camden, Jersey City, Collingswood and Trenton, New
Jersey; and Evansville, Indiana. The following jurisdictions provide for the regis-
tration of persons who have been convicted either of a felony or of other enumerated
offenses: Las Vegas and Reno, Nevada; Los Angeles, Pasadena, San Diego, and
San Jose, California; and Phoenix, Arizona.
42. Los Angeles, California.
43. Pensacola and St. Petersburg, Florida.
44. Arcadia and South Gate, California; Camden and Collingswood, New Jersey;
Canton and Springfield, Ohio; Coral Gables and St. Petersburg, Florida; and Evans-
ville, Indiana.
45. Every locality cited in note 44 supra, except Canton and Springfield, Ohio.
46. Every locality cited in note 44 supra, except St. Petersburg, Florida.
47. Apparently this provision was to accomplish the same purpose as the pro-
vision cited in text at note 49 infra. Miami Beach, Florida, has a similar provision.
48. These sections include such offenses as constructing a road or railroad through
a cemetery, NEv. Comp. LAws § 10160 (1929), and selling horsemeat without being
able to exhibit the hide of the animal, N-v. Comp. LAws § 10208 (1929).
49. See, e.g., Las Vegas, Nevada; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Pasadena, Cali-
fornia; and Phoenix, Arizona.
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hand, X characterizes the offense as a felony, but Y does not, the person
still has to register under the ordinance. The purpose of such a provision
apparently is to bring all persons who have committed acts which the
registering jurisdiction considers dangerous within the scope of its ordi-
nance. A possible interpretation of the Norfolk, Virginia, ordinance would
require the registration of anyone who had committed an offense punish-
able as a felony anywhere outside the state; this interpretation would make
the ordinance of questionable validity since it would appear to place the
burden upon the prospective registrant of knowing the law regarding the
nature of a felony of every jurisdiction in the world.50
Effect of a Pardon for the Prior Offense Upon the Registration
Liability: The effect which should be given to a pardon in recidivist-
orientated legislation, such as criminal registration ordinances, should de-
pend on the basis upon which the pardon was granted. Usually pardons
are granted either because of post-conviction discovery of evidence that
the individual is innocent,51 or because of a quasi-political determination
that circumstances warrant a remission of sentence or a restoration of civil
rights; -2 but, unfortunately, most state procedures do not require that the
reason or basis upon which a pardon is granted be stated in the pardon
records.53 When recidivist-orientated statutes are silent, state courts will
usually adjudge one a prior offender, regardless of the fact that the pre-
vious conviction was pardoned.5 4 The same result would probably follow
under the criminal registration ordinances; and, therefore, it would appear
that some provision should be made in these ordinances concerning the
effect of a pardon.
50. The Norfolk, Virginia, ordinance provides: "Any person who . . . has been
or may hereafter be convicted of any offense punishable as a felony in the state or
elsewhere . . . shall report. . . ." (Italics added.)
The Jersey City, New Jersey, ordinance bases registration upon having com-
mitted either certain enumerated crimes or any crime which would result in loss of
suffrage in New Jersey whether the crimes were committed in New Jersey or not.
51. This may be inferred from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (1946), which provide
that in Court of Claims suits to recover for an unjust conviction a presidential pardon
containing a finding that the convicted person did not commit the act charged is
equivalent to a judicial finding of innocence. State procedure usually does not
afford any judicial procedure for vacating a judgment of guilty after the passage of
significant time.
52. "Probably the majority of pardons granted throughout the country are for
the purpose of restoring these civil rights after the service of sentence." Weihofen,
The Effect of Pardon, 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 177, 180 (1939). See People v. Biggs,
9 Cal.2d 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937); Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28
HARv. L. REv. 647 (1915).
53. Weihofen, The Effect of Pardon, 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 177 (1939).
54. In People of State of New York ex rel. Martin Prisament v. Brophy, 287
N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468 (1941), the defendant was held a prior offender although
a presidential pardon stated that: "Whereas it has been made to appear to me that
the said . . . is innocent of the offense for which he is now being held. .. ."
The court's rationale was that such an executive determination does not vacate a
valid judgment of conviction. See also, Jones v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 70, 147 S.W.2d
508 (1941), overruling, Scrivoner v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 194, 20 S.W.2d 416
(1928). Contra: State v. Childers, 197 La. 715, 2 So.2d 189 (1941).
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Approximately one-half of the ordinances provide that a pardoned
conviction will not create registration liability,5 5 but even these do not
consider the basis upon which the pardon was granted. The remaining
ordinances do not deal with the problem of pardoned convictions.5 16 The
Pasadena, California, ordinance has a slight variation which provides that
any person, except a drug addict, who has at any time been placed on
probation and whose conviction has been set aside, is not deemed a con-
victed person.5 7  Although the Philadelphia ordinance provides that one
pardoned by competent legal authority need not register, it fails to con-
sider the effect on this provision of a Pennsylvania statute which states
that the completion of any sentence "shall have the like effects and conse-
quences as a pardon by the governor. . . . s This statute was repealed
in 19395 9 and there is authority to the effect that the statute will apply
only to those who have completed their sentences prior to repeal.60 Never-
theless, it is quite possible that if persons charged with violating the Phila-
delphia ordinance had had proper counsel, the provisions of this statute
might have been utilized in order to relieve many of the defendants of the
registration liability. It is also likely that one convicted in Nebraska and
granted a discharge warrant need not register under the ordinances which
exclude pardoned convictions, since such a warrant granted on expiration
of sentence restores civil rights in the same manner as does a pardon.01
Effect Given to Parole, Probation, and Suspended Sentence: The
rehabilitative aims of parole, probation, and suspended sentence 0 2 generally
are not considered or reflected in the criminal registration ordinances; for
only a few of them provide that persons on parole or probation, and
55. E.g., Akron, Ohio; Arcadia, California; Atlantic City, New Jersey; Coral
Gables, Florida; Evansville, Indiana; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania.
56. The Birmingham, Alabama, and Hot Springs, Arkansas, ordinances exempt
those who have had their civil rights restored to them by competent legal authority.
The Reno, Nevada, ordinance provides that one whose conviction has been set aside
in a manner provided by law shall not be considered a convicted person. It is not
clear whether this provision applies to pardons or convictions set aside on appeal.
See text at note 34 and note 34 supra. The Los Angeles, California, ordinance
has a provision similar to that of Reno, but it does not exempt persons who have
been convicted of certain sex crimes whose "conviction has been set aside at the
termination of probation, and in connection therewith ... "
57. The Las Vegas, Nevada; Phoenix, Arizona; and San Jose, California,
ordinances have similar provisions. See also text at note 63 et seq. infra.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 893 (Purdon 1930). In Perkins v. United States,
99 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1938), it was held that on the basis of Pennsylvania cases this
legislative pardon is equivalent to the usual executive- pardon.
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5201 (Purdon 1939).
60. In United States ex rel. Forino v. Garfinkel, 166 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1948),
it was held that the statute would not apply to a convict whose sentence did not
expire until after the repeal, even though the conviction and part of the prison term
had occurred before the repeal. The district court in the same case had held that
the repeal would be ex post facto legislation if held to apply to one who had com-
mitted a crime prior to the repeal, because it changed the penalty. 69 F. Supp. 846
(W.D. Pa. 1947).
61. NEB. Rv. STAT. § 29-2634 (1948).
62. See BARNEs AND TzETzRs, Nzw HowzoNs IN C=iNoLoGY 758 (2d ed.
1951).
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persons who have completed parole or probation periods without revoca-
tion, need not register.6 These provisions are consistent with the attempts
to rehabilitate the parolee or anyone on probation. However, no ordinance
was found which specifically excluded persons serving a suspended sen-
tence from the registration liability. The Evansville, Indiana, ordinance,
which requires registration -only if a conviction is followed by a sentence
to serve a term in any state or federal penitentiary, may exclude offenders
who have been given a suspended sentence. Those persons who have
received a suspended sentence or have been placed on probation may not
be required to register even under the ordinances which have no specific
provision concerning such individuals, since it might be held that a con-
viction followed by probation or a suspended sentence does not have the
essential finality which is necessary to impose the registration liability.
4
All the criminal registration ordinances should contain provisions
which are consistent with the rehabilitative efforts of persons on parole,
probation or suspended sentence. The framing of these provisions should
involve the weighing of various factors, such as: (1) whether the person
has indicated criminal tendencies prior to the crime for which he has re-
ceived a suspended sentence or is now on parole or probation; (2) whether
the amount of surveillance the person is under during this period would
tend to lessen the need for registration; (3) the degree of conflict between
the rehabilitative attempts of parole, probation, and suspended sentence and
the harassment of criminal registration ordinances; and (4) the conflict be-
tween the aim of parole, probation and suspended sentence to minimize
the stigma of criminal conviction6 5 and the imposition by the ordinances
of an additional stigma on the convicted person.
63. The South Gate, California, ordinance provides: "That nothing in this ordi-
nance shall be deemed or constructed to apply to any person . . . who is or shall be
on parole or probation under the laws of the state of California, or whose parole or
probation period under the laws of the state of California shall have expired without
any revocation of such parole or probation having been made." Other localities have
similar provisions with some variation: Arcadia, California-same as South Gate;
Collingswood, New Jersey-same as South Gate except that parole or probation
must be under New Jersey law; Louisville, Kentucky-same as South Gate except
that parole or probation must be under Kentucky law; Tulsa, Oklahoma-same as
South Gate except that parole or probation must be under Oklahoma or United
States law; Pensacola and Miami Beach, Florida-presently on parole or probation
under the law of any state; Evansville, Indiana-presently on probation under
Indiana law. The San Diego, California, ordinance excepts from registration only
those persons on probation or whose probation has been completed without revoca-
tion, but this exception does not apply to sex criminals. Camden, New Jersey,
had an ordinance which contained a provision similar to that of South Gate but
Camden Ordinance No. 519, adopted Jan. 24, 1935, amended the original ordinance
in order to omit the probation and parole exceptions.
64. Some courts, in the absence of a statute specifically governing the matter,
have come to this result when interpreting multiple offender statutes. See People
ex rel. Marcley v. Lawes, 254 N.Y. 249, 172 N.E. 487 (1930); Fetters v. State,
108 Tex. Crim. 282, 1 S.W.2d 312 (1927) ; Commonvealth ex rel. Farrell, v. Ashe,
93 Pitts. L.J. 293 (Pa. 1945). Contra: People v. Rave, 364 Ill. 72, 3 N.E.2d 972
(1936). See also Note, 5 A.L.R.2d 1086-92 (1949).
65. See BARNEs AND TEETERS, Nmv HoPazoNs Iq CihmiNOLOGY 762 (2d ed.
1951).
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The Treatment of Juveniles Under the Ordinances: In many states
the treatment of juveniles involved in unlawful conduct deviates from the
traditional treatment of adult criminals. The policy of protecting juveniles
from the stigma of a criminal record has been generally reflected in the
juvenile court acts,66 wherein various types of anti-social behavior are
known as delinquencies rather than crimes. The offenders are treated
by the state as its wards rather than its prisoners; the records are usually
confidential and in many states fingerprinting is forbidden. This modern
policy, however, is not considered in the criminal registration ordinances.
Only the Jersey City, New Jersey, ordinance deals with the problem, but
it reaches a result contrary to the modem trend by requiring the registra-
tion of any person who, while a juvenile, committed an offense which
would require registration if it had been committed by a person not a
juvenile.0 " The balance of the ordinances have no specific provision con-
cerning juvenile offenders. However, since most of these ordinances pro-
vide that persons convicted of a crime must register, no registration would
be required if the convicting jurisdiction treated the juvenile's offense as a
delinquency and not a crime; but, under the ordinances requiring regis-
tration if the offense would have been a "crime" if committed in the regis-
tering jurisdiction, 8 a juvenile offender would escape registration only if
both the convicting and registering jurisdictions termed the offense a
delinquency. Thus, the registration liability is dependent not upon the
juvenile's criminal propensities, but upon the manner in which the various
jurisdictions classify his anti-social behavior.
The Effect Given to Time Elapsed Since Conviction or Release from
Penal Servitude: After a convicted person has completed his punishment,
the likelihood that he is rehabilitated should vary directly with the amount
of time elapsed in which he has refrained from subsequent unlawful con-
duct. Therefore, it appears that convicted persons who indicate their
rehabilitation by a long period of constant lawful conduct should be exempt
from registration liability. Although some of the ordinances place no
temporal limitation on a person's liability to register, 9 the more "en-
lightened" ones do contain various formulae for temporal exemptions.
Under many of these ordinances a person must register only if he enters
the jurisdiction within the limitation period, usually five to ten years. 0
66. See Waybright, A Proposed Juvenile Court Act for Florida, 4 U. oF FLA.
L. REv. 16 (1951); Note, Disposition of the Youthful Offender, 47 NoaRTwasRzaN
L. Ray. 224 (1952).
67. The Jersey City, New Jersey, ordinance defines "crime" as: "... (7)
Unlawful commission by a juvenile of any act which would constitute any of the
foregoing violations if done by a person not a juvenile wherever committed in the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or of any State."
68. See text at note 49 and note 49 supra.
69. Atlantic City and Jersey City, New Jersey; Birmingham, Alabama; Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; Reno, Nevada; and Phoenix, Arizona (except that drug addicts
need register only if they have been convicted or adjudged such since Jan. 7, 1936).
70. E.g., Akron, Ohio (ten years); Lakewood, New Jersey (ten years); Phila-
delphia (ten years) ; San Diego, California (ten years); St. Petersburg, Florida
CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCES
This period normally commences after conviction, although in some cases
it commences after release from imprisonment.71 Other ordinances specify
that a person convicted prior to a certain date does not have to register.72
The most surprising temporal limitation provisions, found in eight of the
ordinances, 73 apply the registration liability only to those persons con-
victed of crimes a number of years prior to the effective dates of the ordi-
nances; but no provisions are made for registering persons convicted
after the effective dates.74 For example, the Camden, New Jersey, ordi-
nance states: "Every person who has been convicted in any Federal Court
or the court of any state within ten years prior to the effective date of this
ordinance . . ." must register. Therefore, it would appear that one need
register only if he were convicted of an offense between June 28, 1924, and
the effective date of the Camden ordinance-June 28, 1934.7r The most
probable explanations for these provisions are careless drafting and copy-
ing of other ordinances.
Upon close analysis of even the more enlightened ordinances, it be-
comes evident that the temporal limitation provisions were not carefully
formulated. For instance, none of them provide for a limitation after a
person has registered; and therefore, once a person has registered he
must comply with the requirements of the ordinance for the rest of his life,
(ten years); Lorain and Cincinnati, Ohio (five years); Columbus, Ohio (two
offenses which must occur *ivithin ten years of entrance into the city). Although
Hot Springs, Arkansas, and Lakeland, Florida, have a "three years since conviction"
limitation, it is applied only to persons who were residents at the time of the adoption
of the ordinance.
71. There is little rational basis for using the date of conviction as the starting
point. For example, under the Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance, which requires registra-
tion of persons convicted within five years of entry into the city, a person entering
the city after completing any sentence of more than five years would not have to
register. The Evansville, Indiana, ordinance avoids this difficulty by providing for
the registration of those persons "whose release from such penitentiary has been
less than five (5) years prior to his or her coming into this city from any point out-
side thereof. . . ." Another locality having a similar provision is Long Beach,
California (seven years from conviction if not imprisoned or seven years since re-
lease from prison by discharge or parole).
72. E.g., Pasadena, California (applies only if conviction subsequent to January
1, 1921, or, if conviction prior to that date, term of imprisonment, period of punish-
ment or sentence, term of parole or probationary period did not or will not expire
until after that date) ; Los Angeles, California, requires the registration of all persons
who were convicted of the enumerated crimes subsequent to January 1, 1921, except
that persons convicted of offenses under § 647(5) (vagrancy provision) of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, or if convicted outside of California of any offense which, if com-
mitted in California, would have been punishable under that section need only register
if so convicted after January 1, 1945; San Jose, California, has a provision somewhat
similar to that of Los Angeles.
73. Camden, Collingswood, and Trenton, New Jersey; Coral Gables and Pensa-
cola, Florida; Arcadia and South Gate, California; and Louisville, Kentucky.
74. Some ordinances, however, do provide for the registration of persons con-
victed before and after the effective date of the ordinance. E.g., Harrisburg, Penn-
sylvania; Norfolk, Virginia; and Rochester, New York.
75. Recently an individual, who had been convicted subsequent to June 28, 1934,
was charged with violating the Camden ordinance and his contention that the ordi-
nance was not applicable to him was upheld. As a result, the ordinance, at the
completion of this writing, is in the process of being amended in order to overcome
this difficulty. See Philadelphia Inquirer (N.J. ed.), Sept. 10, 1954, p. 25, col. 8.
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even if he never becomes involved in criminality again. Since there are
exemptions for persons entering the jurisdiction after the required time
following conviction has elapsed, the same policy should be applied to regis-
trants who desist from further criminality. A possible solution would be
to require all persons subject to an ordinance to remain registered only
throughout the limitation period. For example, a person entering a juris-
diction two years before his limitation period has expired would be re-
quired to register and fulfill the other obligations of the ordinance only
for the remaining two years.
Dependence of Registration Obligation Upon Residence or Presence
in the Jurisdiction: The ordinances generally apply to both residents and
those in transit through the city. A number of these ordinances require
a convicted person to register within a specified time after entering the
locality; '76 this period varies from Philadelphia's six hours to Long Beach,
California's thirty days. 77 Some of the ordinances which require only a
resident to register define the term resident to make it applicable to per-
sons who remain within the jurisdiction more than twenty-four hours and
maintain sleeping quarters there.78 In addition to its other provisions
which impose registration liability, the Pasadena, California, ordinance
provides that any convicted person who "comes into or is within the City
limits . . . on five (5) occasions or more, during any thirty (30) day
period," must register immediately on entering the fifth time.7 9 The
reason for such a provision would seem to be that it requires registration
of persons such as drug peddlers and gambling house runners who fre-
quently enter the city but remain there a very short time on each occasion.
The Jersey City, New Jersey, ordinance provides that any convicted per-
son who comes into the city with intent to remain five days or more, or
for the purpose of seeking or engaging in employment, must register
immediately, provided that anyone not having the required intent at the
76. Atlantic City, New Jersey, requires registration immediately upon entering
the city. The proposed amendment to the Camden, New Jersey, ordinance has a
similar provision. According to a newspaper report, one Camden official stated that
this provision ". . . would empower Camden city police to pick up ex-convicts who
are simply riding through the city on their way to the shore. Asked if he didn't
think such a law was a little harsh, he replied: 'It may be harsh, but that's the
way we want it.'" Philadelphia Inquirer (N.J. ed.), Sept. 10, 1954, p. 25, col. 8.
77. Camden, Collingswood, Trenton and Lakewood, New Jersey; Cincinnati,
Columbus and Lorain, Ohio; and Evansville, Indiana, provide for registration within
24 hours. Arcadia, San Diego and South Gate, California; Coral Gables, Miami
Beach, Pensacola and St. Petersburg, Florida; Canton, Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky;
and Seattle, Washington provide for registration within 48 hours. Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania; Phoneix, Arizona; and Pasadena and San Jose, California, provide
that every convicted person "who enters and remains in the city of ...
for twenty-four hours, shall within three hours after the expiration of such twenty-
four hour period furnish to the Chief of Police. .. ."
78. Lakeland and Miami, Florida; Birmingham, Alabama; and Hot Springs,
Arkansas. The Fort Lauderdale, Florida, ordinance defines resident so as to make
it apply to persons who remain within the city for twelve hours.
79. A similar provision is found in the following ordinances: Los Angeles and
San Jose, California; Phoenix, Arizona; and Reno, Nevada.
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time of entry who remains for five days must register immediately on the
expiration of the five days. 0 Almost every ordinance makes some pro-
vision for the registration of those convicted persons who are within the
jurisdiction on the effective date of the ordinance. 8'
The Requirements of Registration
The registration requirements imposed by the various ordinances
follow the same general pattern. Usually, the person must register with
the chief of police or some person appointed by him to keep the registration
records. Almost every ordinance has a provision permitting the register-
ing authority to take fingerprints and photographs.8 2  All the ordinances
require the registrant to supply the police with certain information which
must be given either under oath 83 or in the form of a signed statement.
8 4
A typical provision as to the information which must be furnished is found
in the Camden, New Jersey, ordinance:
"[A convicted person] . . . shall furnish . . . the true name of such
person and each other name or alias by which such person is or has
been known, a full and complete description of himself, the place of
his birth and present residence, the name or designation of the crime
or crimes hereinabove in this section enumerated of which he shall
have been convicted, together with the name of the place where each
such crime or crimes was or were committed, the name under which
he was convicted and the date of the conviction thereof, the name if
any, and the location of each prison, reformatory or other penal
institution in which he shall have been confined as punishment there-
for, together with the location or address of his residence, stopping
place, or living quarters when so convicted, and each one thereof, if
any, and/or the address or location of his intended residence, stopping
place, or living quarters in this City, and each one thereof, with a
description of the character of each such place, whether an hotel,
apartment house, dwelling, or otherwise, giving the street number
thereof, if any, or such description of the address or location thereof
as will so identify the same as to make it possible of location, and the
length of time for which he expects or intends to reside within the
territorial boundaries of this city."
80. Rochester and St. Paul, Minnesota, require registration of those who come
into the city with intent to remain for 24 hours or longer, but provide that everyone
must register within 48 hours of entry.
81. However, the wording of the Akron, Ohio, ordinance would seem to exempt
those in Akron when the ordinance was enacted and who remain in the city there-
after.
82. The following localities make no such provision: Hot Springs, Arkansas;
Lakeland, Florida; and Louisville, Kentucky. While the Miami, Florida, ordinance
makes no provision for fingerprinting and photographing, the police do take them.
83. Atlantic City and Lakewood, New Jersey; Fort Lauderdale, Lakeland and
Miami, Florida; Allentown and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Birmingham, Alabama;
and Hot Springs, Arkansas.
84. Thirty-three localities require signed statements.
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About twenty other localities have somewhat similar provisions, and ap-
proximately seventeen vary only in that they require a listing of all crimes
previously committed rather than just those which would be the basis of
the registration liability. The Atlantic City, New Jersey, ordinance not
only contains most of the requirements of the Camden ordinance, but
also requires information regarding the last place of abode before entering
the city, whether the registrant is an alien or citizen, and, if a naturalized
citizen, the date and place of naturalization.88 Nearly all the ordinances
provide that any person who fails to furnish the information required or
who furnishes false, untrue, or misleading information is subject to the
penalties provided for failing to register.8 6
These information requirements are perhaps unnecessarily excessive,
since, in most cases, the local police obtain sufficient information from
the FBI and the state identification bureaus after the registrant's finger-
print cards are processed.87 Furthermore, it is doubtful that many of the
registrants are capable of furnishing all the required detail.88 These ex-
tensive information requirements probably exist because the ordinances
arose in the early thirties when the data obtainable by fingerprint process-
ing was significantly less than it is today.
Obligations of Registered Persons
Once registered, a person is subject to additional obligations under
the ordinances.80 Almost every ordinance requires the registrant to notify
the registering authority of all changes of address. Although most ordi-
nances give the registrant between twelve and forty-eight hours to make
such notification, the Jersey City, New Jersey, ordinance requires that it
be given "immediately." The Philadelphia ordinance requires, in addition
to notification of change of address, that "any person removing from the
City having once registered with the Bureau shall notify the Superin-
tendent of Police of such removal before leaving the city." Since the
Philadelphia ordinance, like most of the other ordinances, provides that
85. Some variations which are found in one or more localities include: the
sentence imposed for every crime committed (e.g., Atlantic City, New Jersey);
". .. the addresses of his or her residence, or living quarters, in all other cities,
and the address of his or her present or intended residence or living quarters, in all
other cities ... ", date crime was committed, "... length of time he or she
intends to reside in this city or in any other to which he or she plans to go. ... "
(Evansville, Indiana); whether sentence was complied with, and to what extent, or
whether commuted and whether the person has been paroled (e.g., Allentown,
Pennsylvania). Quite a few of the ordinances also provide that the registrant shall
supply other relevant information as the Chief of Police may require (e.g., Harris-
burg and Allentown, Pennsylvania).
86. See text at note 107 et seq. infra. for discussion of the penalties imposed under
the ordinances.
87. See text at and following note 154 infra.
88. See text following note 152 infra.
89. The distinction between a person required to register and a "registered
person" becomes important in this area because the ordinances usually speak of
these obligations in terms of the latter expression. See text at note 36 and note 36
supra.
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failure to furnish any report required by the ordinance shall be subject
to the same penalty as failure to register,90 it would appear that a person
would be subject to arrest under the ordinance for leaving the city without
having first notified the police.
Another provision, found in only a few of the ordinances, 91 requires
the registrants to carry special cards identifying them as "convicted per-
sons," and provides that failure to carry the card is a violation of the
ordinance equal to that of failure to register.92 Even though the Phila-
delphia ordinance does not have such a provision, the city police issue a
similar card to each registrant. A statement that the card must be carried
at all times is printed on the back of each card. 3 The police, on the basis
of this statement, have charged many persons with a violation of the
ordinance for not having the card in their possession.
9 4
Provisions for carrying identification cards are found in municipal
workers' registration laws and in various state laws, including those deal-
ing with the right to operate a motor vehicle or engage in an occupation.
In these situations, such provisions have operative utility in that they
enable the enforcement authority, upon observing an individual engaging
in a particular activity, to determine immediately whether he is authorized
to do so. A similar provision in the Selective Service Act Regulations 95
helps enforcement officials to determine if a person within the proper age
bracket is in violation of the Act. • However, it is difficult to see how the
card-carrying provision in the criminal registration ordinances is useful
in effectuating the purposes of the ordinances. It cannot be determined
that a person is in violation of the ordinance because he does not have a
registration card, since his record must first be inspected in the police file.
This inspection would also disclose whether or not the person is registered.
90. See text at note 86 supra.
91. Camden, Collingswood, Lakewood, Trenton and Atlantic City, New Jersey;
and Birmingham, Alabama. Such provisions are also found in the Illinois and New
Jersey drug addict registration laws. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 192.31 (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:169A-2(4) (1953).
92. For example, the Camden, New Jersey, ordinance provides that: "Every
person so registered shall be given a card of identification by the Chief of Police,
to which shall be annexed a copy of his photograph. There shall also be written
on such card his registry number, the date thereof and the date or length of his
proposed stay in this City, and such other data as the Chief of Police may deem
necessary. Every such person so registered shall carry with him such card of
identification and any failure to have or present the same when requested by any
police officer shall be deemed a violation of this ordinance."
93. The Allentown, Pennsylvania, police also issue a "Civilian Identification
Card" although it is not mandatory under their ordinance. Apparently, criminals are
distinguished from other registrants by the typewritten notation "(Registered)"
which appears on the cards. The California Sex Criminal Registration statute does
not provide for an identification card, but the registration form contains a perforated
slip which is given to the registrant and which is labelled a "Registration Receipt."
Samples of these cards are on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
94. This matter is more thoroughly discussed in the section of the Note dealing
with the practices under the ordinances. See particularly text preceding note 141
infra.
95. 32 CODE FED. REGs. § 1617.1 (1951).
1954]
78 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
Therefore, the utility of the provision is limited. It would appear that
the purposes behind the provision are to increase the difficulty of comply-
ing with the ordinances 96 and to advise law enforcement officers that a
particular individual is an ex-convict and therefore "police-bait." 97 In-
deed, it is because of this latter effect that many registrants will not carry
the card, even when they believe it is required under the ordinances.
Provisions that supposedly dangerous persons must carry identifica-
tion cards are not new in the United States. In several instances, the
Federal Government has imposed such requirements on aliens,98 and at
one time Pennsylvania made a similar attempt.99 Under the Pennsyl-
vania Act the alien registered once a year, paid a one-dollar fee, and re-
ceived an alien registration card. The alien was required to carry the
identification card at all times, display it to any police officer or agent of
the Department of Labor and Industry who demanded it, and show it in
order to register a motor vehicle or obtain a driver's license.
These card-carrying provisions have not been too well received. In
considering the validity of the Pennsylvania Act, the majority opinion of
the United States Supreme Court stated, as dictum:
"The requirement that cards be carried and exhibited has always
been regarded as one of the most objectionable features of proposed
registration systems, for it is thought to be a feature that best leads
itself to tyranny and intimidation." -10
96. "It [the Camden criminal registration ordinance] has, however, this ad-
vantage. . . . If he [the ex-convict] is seized in a raid and cannot show a registra-
tion card he can be taken before a police judge and sentenced immediately to a
ninety-day jail term or fined $200." N.Y. Times, July 15, 1934, § 4, p. 7, col. 4.
97. Interviews with various detectives in Philadelphia indicated that if an in-
dividual carrying a criminal registration card is found in a neighborhood in which
a crime has been committed, or is observed under other suspicious circumstances, he
is more likely to be detained for investigation than an individual not carrying such a,
card. In addition, policemen are sometimes more critical in watching an individual
on the street if they previously have discovered that he is carrying a criminal regis-
tration card.
98. See the Alien Act of 1798, 1 STAT. 577 (1798), (aliens found not to be
dangerous given licenses to remain in country) ; the Act of May 5, 1892, 27 STAT. 25
(1892) (Chinese laborers required to obtain certificates of residence; held valid in
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)).
On July 1, 1928, while Congress was recessed, Secretary of Labor Davis issued
"General Order 106." Representative Cellar stated: "In effect that order provides
for a sort of registration of aliens .
"But here is the real vice of the situation and the core of the difficulty: 'the
admitted alien,' as the order states, 'should be cautioned to present it for inspection
if and when subsequently requested so to do by an officer of the Immigration
Service.'" 70 CONG. REc. 189, 190 (1928).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1801-06 (Purdon 1939). For a discussion of similar
statutes of other states see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 n.8 (1941).
100. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 71 n.3 (1941). The Court declared
the Act invalid because Congress had occupied the entire field in the Federal Alien
Registration Act. Thus, the Court did not consider the possible unconstitutionality
of the card-carrying provision. However, the Court stated that opposition to these
registration laws was based on beliefs that the provisions ". . . were at war with
the fundamental principles of our free government, in that they would bring about
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Congress, in the process of enacting the Alien Registration Law, 101 con-
sidered the desirability of a card-carrying provision,10 2 but did not include
it in the final legislation. However, the strong objections to such pro-
visions have evidently decreased, because the Immigration and Nationality
Revision Act of 1952 requires an alien over eighteen years of age to carry
a registration card at all times. 1 3 The Senate report on the bill indicates
that the card-carrying provision was the most significant change relating
to the registration of aliens. 10 4 The same tendency is being manifested
in the state legislatures, as both the Illinois and New Jersey drug addict
registration statutes, enacted in 1953, contain such provisions. 10
Considering the Supreme Court's dictum in the Pennsylvania Act
case, and the inability of a card-carrying provision to help effectuate the
purposes of the criminal registration ordinances, it is questionable whether
the Court would uphold such a provision under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
0
Penalties Imposed for Violating the Ordinances
Generally, the penalties imposed under the ordinances are the maxi-
mum ones permitted by the various enabling acts under which the criminal
registration ordinances were enacted. 10 7  The Akron, Ohio, ordinance,
for example, provides for a fine of five hundred dollars or imprisonment
for six months in the county jail, or both. 08 Such extreme penalties are
not at all unusual, 0 9 although they seem to be much greater than neces-
unnecessary and irritating restrictions upon personal liberties of the individual,
and would subject aliens to a system of indiscriminate questioning similar to the
espionage systems existing in other lands." Id. at 71.
101. 54 STAT. 673 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §451 et seq. (1942).
102. H.R. 9101 and H.R. 9147, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1929); 72 CONG. Rxc.
3886 (1930). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 71 n.32 (1941). During
consideration of the Alien Registration Bill it was thought by many that the
provision that a card be carried was the most objectionable feature of the proposed
law. See 72 CONG. REc. 3886 et seq. (1930).
113. 66 STAT. 224 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (Supp. 1952). Prior to this
act, an alien was required only to notify the Immigration Bureau of his current
residence.
104. SEN. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1952).
105. See note 91 supra.
106. See text at note 199 et seq. infra for a discussion of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
107. Compare the penalties imposed by the ordinances as described in note
109 infra with the maximum penalty permitted under the enabling acts of the
following states: Minnesota-$100 or three months, MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 412.19(26), 411.78 (West 1947); Nevada-no fine in excess of $500, no term of
imprisonment more than six months, NEv. Cotp. LAWS § 1231 (1930) ; Indiana-300
or six months, IND. STAT. ANN. § 48-1407 (Burns 1950); Florida-$500 and sixty
days, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 165.19 (1943); Ohio-$500 and/or six months, OHIO GEN.
CoDE, § 3628 (1938); New Jersey-$200 and/or ninety days, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§40:49-5 (1953).
108. Other localities having the same penalty include: Pasadena and San Jose,
California; Shaker Heights and Springfield, Ohio; and Las Vegas, Nevada.
109. The ordinances imposing the maximum penalty allowed under the enabling
acts and the amounts thereof include: $500 and/or 90 days-Lorain, Columbus and
Cincinnati, Ohio; $500 and/or six months-Las Vegas, Nevada; $500 and/or sixty
days-Coral Gables and Pensacola, Florida; $300 and/or 180 days-Evansville,
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sary to insure compliance with the ordinances. Philadelphia, which ap-
parently has a very high rate of compliance,11 has a penalty of only one
hundred dollars fine or thirty days in the county jail in default thereof.,',
The penalty imposed by this ordinance, however, is the heaviest that can
be imposed under the Pennsylvania enabling statute." 2  One of the ordi-
nances provides only that any violation is a misdemeanor," 3 thus permitting
the application of the general statutory punishment for misdemeanors."
4
Since many ordinances require that certain information be given under
oath," 5 it is possible that a registrant who provides false information will
be in violation of the applicable state statute penalizing perjury., 6
Quite a few of the ordinances provide that each day during which a
violation of the ordinance continues is a separate violation." 7 The en-
forcement of such a provision might make the punishment for failure to
Indiana; $300 and/or three months-Arcadia and South Gate, California; and Seattle,
Washington; $200 and/or 90 days-Atlantic City, Camden, Collingswood, Jersey
City, Lakewood and Trenton, New Jersey (Atlantic City, Collingswood and Lake-
wood also provide for an additional 90 days imprisonment in default of fine) ; $100
or 90 days-Rochester and St. Paul, Minnesota.
110. See Appendix C infra.
111. The Philadelphia ordinance provides: "Any person required by the terms
of this ordinance to register, and failing to do so, or who . . . in any other manner
violates the terms and provisions of this ordinance . . . shall be subject to a fine of
one-hundred dollars ($100) for each offense, recoverable with costs, together with
judgment of imprisonment not exceeding thirty days if the amount of said fine and
costs shall not be paid into the court imposing the fine within ten days from the date
of the imposition thereof, as provided for in the act of March 25, 1929, P.L. 66."
There is some question as to whether the defendant, after conviction, will be dis-
charged for ten days pending payment of the fine, even in a case in which it is
obvious that such payment is impossible. The Philadelphia practice appears to be
to release the prisoner for the ten days only if he is actually aware of his rights.
From the context of the ordinance, it is obvious that many undesirables will either
leave town or make it difficult for the police to recapture them, and a few police
officers thought that the ten-day provision reduced the effectiveness of the ordinance.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, has a similar provision except that it provides for a penalty
of $100 or 90 days in default thereof.
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §3451 (Purdon 1931). The wording of the Phila-
delphia ordinance is exactly the same as that of this statute. It is interesting to
note that in Pennsylvania a municipality smaller than Philadelphia is permitted to
impose a larger penalty for violation of its criminal registration ordinance. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12198-2403(60) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
113. Hot Springs, Arkansas.
114. Some ordinances merely declare registration to be required and prohibit
false registration without providing any penalty. See, e.g., Phoenix, Arizona; Reno,
Nevada; St. Petersburg, Florida; and San Diego, California. Under such cir-
cumstances, the penalty for violating the ordinance would probably be provided for
in a general penalty section of the municipal code. See, e.g., SAN DmO MUNICIPAL
CODE § 11.12 (1952).
115. See note 83 supra.
116. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118, 125 (1949) .(perjury); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 837.01 (1944) (perjury otherwise than in judicial proceedings); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:131-4 (1953) (false swearing); OmIo GEN. CODE § 12842 (Page 1938)
(perjury); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (Purdon 1945) (false statement under
oath).
117. E.g., Arcadia, Los Angeles, San Diego and South Gate, California; Akron
and Springfield, Ohio; Rochester and St. Paul, Minnesota; Coral Gables, Florida;
Evansville, Indiana; Louisville, Kentucky; and Seattle, Washington.
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register exceed the punishment for some of the most serious felonies."18
Although Pasadena, California, has such a provision, it limits its effect by
providing that no person shall be convicted more than once on account of
violations occurring by reason of failure to register on a series of days
not interrupted by a conviction or acquittal under the ordinance."19
Almost all of the ordinances provide that the same penalty applies to
any violation of the ordinance. This would include failure to register,
failure to notify of change of address, failure to carry the registration
card,'120 or failure to furnish any information required by the ordinance,
or furnishing false, untrue or misleading information.
Access to the Registration Records and Files
The majority of the ordinances contain some provision which limits
access to the registration records to certain specified persons or organiza-
tions. Some provide that the registration records are confidential and
make it unlawful to disclose to unauthorized persons any information con-
tained in them.' 2 ' Some provide that the photographs may be exhibited
to any person to help identify perpetrators of a crime,'2 and some allow
the free exchange of registration data with other police or law enforcement
agencies.1 3
It is doubtful whether these provisions have any practical effect.
Apparently, the general police practice is to treat these records in much
the same manner as other police data.'2 Therefore, the degree of disclosure
of the materials varies from one police department to another. The prac-
tice of some police departments, especially in the smaller cities, of divulging
such information to business firms could have a damaging effect on the
rehabilitative efforts of an ex-convict who is seeking employment.
118. For example, a convicted person who enters Springfield, Ohio, and remains
there for a year without registering would be liable for a possible fine of $181,500
and over 181 years in prison.
119. Other localities employ a similar provision to limit the extent of the punish-
ment for violations of their ordinances. E.g., Las Vegas and Reno, Nevada.
120. Only the Illinois drug addict registration statute provides different penalties
for failure to register and failure to carry the registration card. "Any drug addict
who fails to register as provided by this Act shall be imprisoned for not less than
six months nor more than one year. Any drug addict who fails to carry his regis-
tration card as provided by this Act shall be fined not less than one dollar nor more
than $100 or impirsoned for more than one year, or both." ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38,
§ 192.32 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1953).
121. E.g., Cincinnati, Columbus and Lorain, Ohio; and Seattle, Washington
(unlawful) ; Los Angeles and Pasadena, California; and Phoenix, Arizona (misde-
meanor).
122. See, e.g., Los Angeles and Pasadena, California; Las Vegas and Reno,
Nevada; Phoenix, Arizona; Jersey City, New Jersey; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
123. See, e.g., Los Angeles and Pasadena, California; Las Vegas and Reno,
Nevada; Phoenix, Arizona; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
124. This is more likely to be true in a locality in which the ordinance provides
only that the registration information shall become part of the permanent records
of the police. E.g., Miami Beach and St. Petersburg, Florida.
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THE CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCES IN OPERATION
The registration process, the police enforcement of the ordinances,
the prosecutions under the ordinances, and the minor judiciary's disposi-
tion of the violations charged were observed in studying the practical
application of the criminal registration ordinances. The information upon
which the following discussion is based was obtained, to a large degree,
from interviews with officials and members of the Philadelphia and Cam-
den, New Jersey, Police Departments 125 and from their records. Addi-
tional information was obtained through correspondence with police officials
of other localities.
Sources of Infornation Available to Convicted Persons Regarding
Existence of the Ordinances
Substantial compliance with the ordinances can be obtained only if
those persons who are required to register have been informed of their
obligations. A large number of prisons advise their inmates, upon dis-
charge, of the possible existence of these ordinances and suggest that they
ask their local police whether or not such an ordinance is in effect. It is
more likely that this policy would be followed by penal institutions situated
near localities which have these ordinances. 2 6 In addition, many parole
and probation officials in cities which have ordinances advise the ex-
convicts reporting to them to register with the police department. 2 7 A
majority of the individuals, who were observed as they registered with the
125. Due to the. confidential nature of many of these sources in most cases it has
been necessary to omit the names of the persons involved.
126. The warden of the Lehigh County Prison informs all discharged prisoners
of the existence of the Allentown, Pennsylvania, ordinance. Letter from Sergeant
Francis McCafferty, Allentown, Pennsylvania, Police Bureau of Identification
(March 16, 1954). In a letter of March 23, 1954, Denver E. McWilliams, Supervisor
of the Bureau of Identification and Records of the Phoenix, Arizona, Police De-
partment states: "The State Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Arizona Prison
authorities advise all releasees of this ordinance, and other officials, such as the
sheriff's office, Adult Probation Office, judges, etc., have sent many convicted per-
sons to this department to register." The South St. Paul, Minnesota, Police De-
partment reported that it is advised by the state whenever a felon is released, and
that the felon is also advised of his registration obligation by the releasing agency.
Letter from Louis Fuller, Chief of Police of South St. Paul, Minnesota (March 26,
1954). The Cincinnati, Ohio, Police Department stated: "Probation and parole
authorities and penal institutions notify all paroled or released prisoners of the pro-
visions of the ordinance." Letter from Stanley R. Schrotel, Chief of Police of
Cincinnati (July 26, 1954). A few of the individuals interviewed upon reporting
to the Philadelphia police stated that they had been advised to register upon dis-
charge from a penal institution.
The California Sex Criminal Registrtaion Act requires all penal officers to advise
sex criminals, upon discharge, of the registration act, and to secure from such
persons a signed statement to the effect that they have been so advised. Notification
of such release must then be sent to the State Bureau of Identification. The Act
also has a similar provision applicable to courts placing persons convicted of sex
offenses on probation or discharging such persons upon payment of a fine. CAL.
PENAL CoDE § 290 (Supp. 1953).
127. Letter from 0. L. Blough, Chief of Police, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (March
29, 1954). See also letters from Phoenix, Arizona, and South St. Paul, Minnesota,
police departments, supra note 126.
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Philadelphia police, stated that they had learned of the registration re-
quirement from their parole or probation officers. Every parolee who
has been released from a Pennsylvania penal institution should know that
he may be required to register, since each is given a list of rules governing
his parole, one of which provides:
"If, by the provision of any municipal, county, State, or Federal law,
ordinance, or order, you are required to register as a person convicted
of a crime, you will register with the proper authority immediately
upon arrival in such locality." 128
Various Philadelphia probation authorities disclosed that they had been
requested by the Philadelphia Police Department to send all persons on
probation to the Identification Division to be registered. The members of
the probation division did not have a copy of the Philadelphia ordinance,
and their only knowledge of the ordinance seemed to be that generally it
requires a person convicted of a serious offense to register. They stated
that it was their practice to send everyone on probation to the Identifica-
tion Division and allow the Division to decide whom it would require to
register. However, a few members of the probation division did state that
in certain cases they would not send a person on probation to register.
For example, one probation officer said that he thought that a person who
had been given a suspended sentence on a charge of assault and battery
by automobile, should not be required to register under the ordinance;
and, therefore, he would not necessarily send such a person to register.
129
As a result of the attitude of the probation department, many persons not
affected by the Philadelphia ordinance were sent to the police to register;
while it seems that quite a few who were required to register were not
advised of their obligation to do so, and possibly as a result thereof, they
were placed in a position vulnerable to prosecution for failure to register.
A person may also learn of his registration obligation from judges,
police and the "grapevine." Many Philadelphia judges advise persons who
are given suspended sentences to "go upstairs and register," and a similar
practice is probably carried on by judges in other jurisdictions.130 Often
the police will advise an individual who has violated the ordinance to
register, although they may not charge him with a violation. The police
do this primarily with individuals who are being questioned about incidents
128. A Philadelphia registrant, upon being interviewed, stated that he would have
disregarded his parole officer's instructions to register had he not noticed similar
instructions on his parole papers. It appears that some parole officers, in Philadel-
phia, at least, fail to impress upon the parolee that failure to register is a criminal
offense. One prisoner, who had failed to register after being advised to do so by
his parole officer, stated that he thought he had "gotten away without registering"
because his parole officer had not mentioned the matter after the initial interview.
129. Although it is possible that a person given a suspended sentence need not
register, see text at note 64 and note 64 s'upra, the practice under the Philadelphia
ordinance is to require such a person to register.
130. See letter from Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department (March 23, 1954)
smpra note 126.
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in which they are not directly involved.181 It appears that a significant
number of registrants have learned of the existence of these ordinances
through the "grapevine." A few persons who registered in Philadelphia
indicated that they had learned of the ordinance through friends. The
St. Paul, Minnesota, Police Department reported that a surprising number
of individuals come directly to the police department upon entering the
city, and state that they heard about the existence of the St. Paul ordinance
while in some other city.132 Many police officials interviewed believed that
the existence of these ordinances was common knowledge among persons
with criminal experiences.
Although no ordinance was discovered which required the posting
of notices as to the existence of the ordinance, the Lakewood, New Jersey,
Police Department's policy is to distribute such notices to hotels, bus
terminals, restaurants, the post office and various other business estab-
lishments.'3 There has been widespread publicity only in St. Paul,
Minnesota, where the public has been informed of the existence of the
ordinance through many newspaper articles and speeches on radio, tele-
vision, and to various social groups. 3 4 Some of the other localities ap-
parently rely on the publicity accompanying both the adoption of the
ordinance and the first few arrests and convictions.185
It thus appears that persons within the scope of the ordinances prob-
ably know of their existence. This is especially true of those who have
been convicted and placed in a penal institution or on probation or parole
in a locality having a criminal registration ordinance. Unfortunately, a
transient from an area in which these ordinances are not in effect might
not be aware that they exist elsewhere.'3 6 Therefore, he must rely almost
entirely upon the "grapevine" or "prisonwise" friends. A provision in
the ordinances, requiring the posting of notices in public places,' 37 would
seem to be a desirable and necessary method of publicity.
131. See text following note 155 infra, with reference to the practice of not
always charging persons discovered to be in violation of the ordinance.
132. Letter from N. C. McMahon, Chief of Police, St. Paul, Minnesota (March
22, 1954).
133. Letter from W. L. Comstock, Chief of Police, Lakewood, New Jersey
(Feb. 17, 1954).
134. Letter from N. C. McMahon, Chief of Police, St. Paul, Minnesota (March
22, 1954). The Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance has been publicized through press and
radio facilities. Letter from Stanley R. Schrotel, Chief of Police, Cincinnati, Ohio
(July 26, 1954). The Jersey City, New Jersey, ordinance has been published in all
local newspapers. Letter from James L. McNamara, Chief of Police, Jersey City,
New Jersey (July 20, 1954).
135. Letter from Dan B. Hudson, Chief of Detectives, Evansville, Indiana
(March 15, 1954); letter from Henry I. Fink, Acting Chief of Police, Santa Ana,
California (August 5, 1954).
136. For example, an ex-convict from the northeast section of the country could
not be expected to know that these ordinances exist in other areas when police
officers in the northeast evidently do not know they exist. One official from a north-
east locality requested that we define "criminal registration ordinance." Letter from
Captain John Graham, Bureau of Records, Police Department, Lowell, Massachusetts
(March 28, 1954). See text following note 27 supra.
137. See text at note 133 supra.
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Police Knowledge of the Ordinances and Their Provisions
Proper administration and enforcement of a criminal registration ordi-
nance can be accomplished only if the enforcement personnel have a
thorough knowledge of its provisions. In Philadelphia, the personnel of
the Identification Division, which handles the registration process, were
very familiar with the ordinance's provisions, with one exception. Al-
though Division personnel were informing the registrants of their obliga-
tions, they were misinforming them as to one requirement. 3 8 The regis-
tration identification card, which is given to the registrant, contains a
statement that the card must be carried at all times. 139 All the Division
personnel, as well as the sergeant in charge, believed that the ordinance
contained such a provision. A quick check of the ordinance, copies of
which were readily available in the Identification Division, would have
shown that there is no provision for carrying or even issuing such a card.
The sergeant in charge later stated that informing a registrant to carry
the card at all times was "good advice and for the registrant's own
convenience."
In contrast to the Identification Division's knowledge of the ordinance,
the knowledge of the enforcement personnel was inadequate. Under the
organization of the Philadelphia Police Department, the enforcement of
the criminal registration ordinance will usually fall upon detectives, rather
than uniformed patrolmen. 140 For the most part, copies of the ordinance
were not available to the individual detectives. However, a few detectives
interviewed did have copies, and some of the detective divisions had copies
in loose leaf ordinance and statute books which were available to any
officer. It appeared that most detectives and uniformed policemen knew
that some kind of registration law existed, but did not seem to know the
specific content of the ordinance. A considerable majority of the detectives
interviewed believed that failure to carry a registration card was a viola-
tion of the ordinance, and several persons were officially charged with
such a violation. This mistake was caused partially by the statement on
the back of the registration card,' 4 ' and partially by a false analogy of the
registration card to Selective Service registration cards and drivers' licenses.
With few exceptions, even those officers who understood that failure to
carry a card was not a violation did not know what persons are required
to register and they acted on the belief that anyone convicted of any crime
138. In first observing the registration process it was noticed that registrants
were not being informed of their obligations under the ordinance. Upon being ques-
tioned about the importance of this, the police officials stated that they usually do
inform the registrants and that the few instances observed were probably caused by
their being too busy. Later observations confirmed this statement.
139. See text at note 93 supra.
140. For any offense more serious than drunkenness and disorderly conduct, the
detectives determine the particular offense to be charged against an individual. It
is usually beyond the scope of a uniformed policeman's duties to determine whether
or not a person has violated the registration ordinance.
141. See text at note 93 supra.
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at any time is under the registration liability.14 However, efficient use
is made of the officers' knowledge that registered criminals do carry reg-
istration cards.'4
Police Attitude Toward the Ordinances
The attitude of enforcement officials toward the Philadelphia ordinance
was divided. All personnel in the Identification Division were in favor of
the ordinance. The sergeant in charge believed that, as the registration
information increased, the detective divisions' task of protecting society
from criminals would become easier. The same opinion was expressed
by the Camden, New Jersey, officials. On the other hand, the vast ma-
jority of the Philadelphia detectives were apathetic to the ordinance. Al-
though many believed that the ordinance was desirable and favored its
registration aspects, they thought it was ineffective. Among the reasons
they gave for the inutility of the ordinance were: (1) the charges of vio-
lation are always thrown out by the magistrate; 144 (2) only indigent de-
fendants ever serve time on a violation of the ordinance because it is not
constitutional and will never be sustained against a defendant who has a
lawyer; 145 (3) detectives are too busy to check an individual's record
for the information necessary to sustain the charges; (4) the fact that
an individual is usually arrested with other charges against him eliminates
the need to hold him on the violation of the ordinance; 146 and (5) the
police cannot arrest a person solely because he is violating the ordinance
since there is no way of detecting the violation.'
47
A surprisingly large number of police officials expressed opposition
to the ordinance and believed that it was unconstitutional. Some based
their belief on the thought that the ordinances were indistinguishable from
the unconstitutional New Jersey "gangster" law; 148 while others merely
said that this was not the kind of control that the police should have. A
few stated that once a man "serves his debt to society" he should be free
and not constantly harassed by the police.
However, some detectives stated that they were in favor of the ordi-
nance and did make use of it. One detective expressed favor because
he thought that the ordinance kept criminals out of town,149 created the
impression among registered criminals that they were under constant police
142. After this study had begun and several interviews had been held with
police, additional copies of the ordinance became available to the enforcement per-
sonnel, and the later phases of the study showed that police knowledge of the ordi-
nance's provisions had increased.
143. See text at note 97 and note 97 supra.
144. Compare text following note 183 et seq. in fra.
145. See text following note 176 ifra.
146. See text following note 159 and Appendix E infra.
147. See text following note 95 supra.
148. See text at notes 11, 12 and notes 11, 12 supra.
149. The detective had first-hand knowledge of a few cases in which undesirables
stayed out of Philadelphia because of the ordinance.
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surveillance, and informed local police of a transient criminal's entry into
the city. Other detectives were in favor of the ordinance because they
could use it occasionally and selectively "to make it rough on a fellow"
they know is "wrong," or to hold a man until they can check the details
regarding a more serious crime.150
The Registration Process
In Philadelphia and Camden, New Jersey, any person required to
register may do so at any time, as the police division which administers
registration is open twenty-four hours a day. Although he is not in
police custody, the registrant is usually accorded the same treatment as
persons arrested and "booked" for a hearing. However, the identification
process of any arrested person is at all times given prior attention, and
the registrant must wait until that is completed. This priority arises be-
cause a police officer is waiting for the prisoner, and not necessarily out
of disregard of registrants. The registration process takes from fifteen
minutes to one hour in Philadelphia and about ten minutes in Camden,
New Jersey, although in Camden the registrant must then wait until his
photograph is developed.
In Philadelphia when a criminal appears for registration the police
clerk at the Identification Division fills out three forms. The first form
is a registrant's general information sheet. The ordinance enumerates
information which must be obtained about a registrant's criminal record, 51
and the form follows this enumeration, omitting to ask, however, whether
a criminal's sentence or sentences have been commuted and whether he
has been paroled. Under the ordinance the superintendent of police may
also request any other relevant information, and the form requires from
the registrant information concerning the length of time he has been at
his present address, his addresses during the past three years, intended
address, expected length of stay in the city, nationality, place of birth,
naturalization (including where and when), a physical description, 152 any
aliases, and present occupation. Also required is the name and location
of penal institutions in which the criminal has served sentences. Usually
it is impossible for the registrant to furnish all this information and the
clerks do not insist that the forms be completely filled out. A clerk takes
this form and checks the police records to determine if the person has a
prior record on file.15 If the registrant has a police record, a photograph
will be taken only if the one in the file is more than two years old. The
150. See text following note 166 infra.
151. The Philadelphia ordinance requires the registrant's number, time and
place of convictions, nature of the crimes, sentences imposed, sentences, if any,
which were commuted and any paroles granted.
152. The Philadelphia police are particularly alert for marks or scars which
would indicate that the registrant is a drug addict.
153. At Camden no attempt is made to check the prior records until after the
registrant leaves and his fingerprints are classified.
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second form is a fingerprint card. Fingerprints are nearly always taken,
and the form is filled out in triplicate. The third form is the registration
card which is given to the registrant. All three of these forms must be
signed by the registrant. The general information sheet is filed under
the registrant's identification number, and a notation is made on his police
record that he has registered. One set of fingerprints is placed in the
police files, one set is sent to the state police and another is sent to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation." 4 On the set sent to the FBI there
will appear a notation that the person has registered under the ordinance.
The FBI upon receipt of the fingerprint card will classify the prints and
check its records for the individual's dossier. A notation of the date and
place of criminal registration will be made on the master record, and a
mechanically-reproduced copy of the individual's complete previous rec-
ords, showing all events (including criminal registration) for which the
FBI received a set of fingerprint cards, will be sent to every former police
source from which the FBI received fingerprint cards. This record will
contain a list of all past and present orders of various law enforcement
agencies showing that a particular person was or is wanted by such agencies.
As a result, regardless of the information secured from the registrant, the
police will get a full and complete report on the registrant's prior record and
present status.
Enforcement of the Ordinances
Enforcement of the ordinances is accomplished both by informing a
convicted person of his registration obligation 15 and by prosecuting when
violations occur. Although a person may be arrested solely because detec-
tives know he is violating the ordinance, no such case was found in Phila-
delphia or Camden. However, some persons were arrested who were sus-
pected of being involved in a crime and later found to be in violation of
the ordinance. An arrested person, the arresting officer, and any com-
plainants go to the detective division for interrogation which will deter-
mine the offense or offenses to be charged. A great many violations of
the criminal registration ordinance become apparent at this time, either
through the voluntary admission of the person that he was convicted of
a crime and has not registered, or through a check of the police record and
the criminal registration files. Most of the charges of violation made in
Philadelphia during the course of this study resulted from the informa-
tion thus secured. Usually the detectives are instructed to lodge every
offense for which the person may be convicted, but not everyone found
to be in violation of the criminal registration ordinance is so charged. In
154. The Las Vegas, Nevada, workers' registration ordinance specifically provides
for a set of fingerprints to be sent to the FBI. Most of the criminal registration
ordinances allow such information to be sent to any law enforcement agency. See
text at note 123 supra. Although the Philadelphia and Camden ordinances are silent
in this respect, the practice always is to send a copy of fingerprints to the FBI.
155. See text following 125 supra.
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addition, a number of cases were found in which an individual had been
previously arrested in Philadelphia for an offense and, at the same time,
he had been in violation of the ordinance but the latter offense had not
been charged. A possible explanation for this is that the available per-
sonnel in a particular criminal investigation division temporarily could
not complete all their administrative tasks. Under such circumstances it is
only natural that a detective will not thoroughly examine the minor cases
and, having a substantial basis for a more serious charge, he will have
neither the time nor the inclination to check the details necessary to charge a
violation of the criminal registration ordinance. Under such circumstances
a detective might forget to list a violation even though he has the relevant
information. Occasionally, a violation is discovered only after the person
has been taken to the Identification Division and fingerprinted and a re-
port received from the FBI.
An examination of police records and of reports from other localities
indicated that the Philadelphia police were not alone in failing to lodge a
charge against arrested persons who were in violation of the ordinance.'5 6
A pattern of selective enforcement was demonstrated, but whether such
a pattern was intentional or not was difficult to determine.'
57
Prosecutions Under the Ordinances
It is difficult to determine what violation of the ordinance is being
charged either from an examination of the scanty records or from inter-
views with the officials who lodged the charges. Generally, in Philadelphia,
the charge stated in the records is merely "violation of the criminal regis-
tration ordinance." Occasionally, the notation is "failing to carry a crim-
inal registration card" or "failing to register." Within the past few years,
it is probable that no one has been charged with a technical violation of the
ordinance, such as failure to notify the police of change of address, 15s or
supplying false information.'5 9
During the first nine months of 1953 there were 68 persons charged
with violating the ordinance, including one person who was charged with a
violation on two different occasions. Of these 69 cases only 19 involved
156. See Appendix D infra (San Jose, California and St. Paul, Minnesota).
The police records indicated that many persons previously had been arrested in
various localities which have ordinances but that they were not charged with violating
the ordinances although their records at the time of arrest showed that they were
in violation.
157. Because of the more intensive study in Philadelphia, this pattern was more
closely discerned and will be discussed below. The information obtained from other
localities demonstrates that the enforcement of these ordinances varies from locality
to locality. See Appendices C and D infra.
158. One reported Los Angeles, California, case resulted from the failure of a
registrant to notify the police of his change of address. In re Guy Digiuro, 100
Cal. App.2d 260, 223 P.2d 263, rehwaring denied, 100 Cal. App.2d 260, 223 P.2d 873
(1950). See text at note 185 infra.
159. No official was found in Philadelphia who could recall that either he or
any other official had ever charged anyone for any offense under the ordinance other
than either failure to register or failure to carry a registration card.
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persons who were charged solely with violating the ordinance; in the other
50 the individuals also had other charges lodged against them.1 60 These
50 cases were disposed of as follows: in 12 the persons were discharged
on both the criminal registration violation charge and the other charge;
in 19 the persons were discharged on the criminal registration violation
charge but held for court on at least one of the other charges lodged
against them; in 1 the person was turned over to military authorities;
in 4 the individuals were fined for disorderly conduct and then dis-
charged; and in 14 the persons were fined on the criminal registration
ordinance violation. 161 In 7 of the 19 cases in which the only charge
lodged was violation of the criminal registration ordinance, the persons
were found guilty and fined, while in the other 12 the individuals were
discharged. The total number of cases in which the persons were sub-
jected to the penalties of the ordinance was 21.162
Persons Charged with Violating the Philadelphia 163 Ordinance Who
Appeared Not to Be in Violation: In 24 of the 69 cases there appeared
to be no basis for the charge of violation. 64 In 11 of these 24 cases
the individuals were registered at the time the charge was lodged against
them. They may have been in technical violation, but this was not indi-
cated in the record, nor brought out in interviews with the officials in-
volved; most of these persons were charged with "failure to carry a regis-
tration card" which is not a violation of the ordinance. In the other 13
cases the persons did not have such prior records which would have
necessitated their registering. Many of these individuals had long crim-
inal records, but not such as to require registration in Philadelphia.165
In some of these cases, because of a large number of arrests, the records
gave the impression that an individual had a long history of criminal ac-
tivity, but careful examination disclosed that there had been no convictions.
In each of these 24 cases, the fact that the individuals involved had not
violated the ordinance would have been obvious to the officers making the
charges if they had known the details of the ordinance 166 or made neces-
sary inquiries.
160. See Appendix E infra.
161. In 6 of these 14 cases, the individuals were discharged on the other charges,
but in the other 8 the persons involved were also held for court on the other
charges.
162. See text at notes 182, 183 and notes 182, 183 infra.
163. Unfortunately, information concerning this aspect of the enforcement and
prosecution under the ordinances could not be obtained from other localities.
164. The police files indicated that in the other 45 cases the persons were not
registered and had a prior record which would have required them to register.
165. In one case the individual had a record of ten arrests dating back to 1937
with convictions of larceny, holdup, and conspiring to violate the internal revenue
laws. But a close examination of his record by one thoroughly acquainted with the
Pennsylvania legislative pardon statute (see note 58 supra) and the Philadelphia
ordinance would reveal that the defendant was released from jail prior to 1939, in
which case he received an automatic legislative pardon, and that the character of the
offenses committed or the length or place in which the sentence was served was
not such as to require registration.
166. See text following note 140 supra.
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Selective Prosecution as a Detention Technique: In Philadelphia
some cases were found which indicated that the prosecutions were for the
purpose of detaining the individuals for investigation. For example, in
one case the police received information that a certain person was involved
in a murder. The individual's prior record disclosed that he had been
arrested in the South on two previous occasions, once for investigation and
once for patronizing a "bawdy house"; but on both occasions he had been
discharged. The only other prior arrest in his record was for reckless
driving and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
He paid a fine on the first charge and the second was dropped. There is
little doubt that this person was being held by the police for investigation
with respect to the murder charge, although it is possible that the officer
who charged the violation acted on the advice of the Identification Divi-
sion that the individual "had a record," without understanding the character
of the record or realizing that anything more than a mere record is re-
quired in order to prosecute a person for violating the ordinance.
There is probably some correlation between the number of persons
who have been charged solely with a violation of the ordinance and the
use of the ordinance for detention purposes. In some localities police
departments admit openly that to them temporary detention is the most
significant use of their ordinance, 6 7 although no information was sub-
mitted as to the number of persons so detained.0 s The Philadelphia prac-
tice in this respect is not as clear as that of these other localities. The
charge of violating the ordinance was the sole charge in only 19 of 69
cases. Of the 13 cases in which persons charged with violations did
not have criminal records which required registration, only 6 involved
individuals who were charged with some other offense, and in only 3 of
these cases was the other charge sufficiently supported by evidence to
warrant holding the individuals for court. It is possible that in all but
the last 3 cases the charge of violating the criminal registration ordinance
was used to detain the individuals.
Selective Prosecution as a Harassing Technique: The criminal reg-
istration ordinances can easily be adapted as an instrument for harassing
undesirables. By following a program of general non-enforcement, some
localities might be able to lull convicted persons into believing that the
ordinance is a "dead letter." As a result, few persons would go through
the registration process. Thus, the police could secure a rather powerful
167. See text at note 19 supra. The Rochester, Minnesota, Police
Department reported: "This ordinance is of great value in investigation, as a
person can be charged having a prior felony record, enabling us to hold until in-
vestigation is completed." Letter from H. M. Fitzpatrick, Captain of Detectives,
Rochester, Minnesota (March 22, 1954). According to the District Attorney of
Santa Clara, California, the City of San Jose did not charge anyone with a violation
during 1952, although ". . . a few have been 'detained' under the ordinance while
being investigated for more serious offenses." Letter from N. J. Menard, District
Attorney of Santa Clara County (Nov. 4, 1953).
168. See "Disposition and Remarks" column in Appendix D infra, with respect
to Las Vegas, Nevada, and San Jose, California.
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weapon to use selectively at their discretion against any person coming
within the purview of the ordinance who might meet with their dis-
pleasure.169 For example, during the first eleven months of 1953, Louis-
ville, Kentucky, prosecuted only two persons for violating its ordinance."7
0
Both individuals were asked to register and to leave town within 12 hours.
The Louisville police report that only approximately 25 persons regis-
tered during the same period. 1 7 The report received from the Miami
Beach, Florida, Police Department appears to demonstrate a policy of
selective prosecution. During 1953 only about 80 persons registered under
the Miami Beach ordinance, despite the transient character of the popu-
lation. During the same period only 36 persons were charged with violat-
ing the ordinance.172 It is probable, considering the existence of a workers'
registration ordinance in Miami Beach,173 that the existence of a sub-
stantial number of violators was brought to the attention of the Miami
Beach police. Persons thus discovered to be in violation of the criminal
registration ordinance were apparently neither charged with violation nor
advised of their registration obligation.174 As a result, some 36 persons
whom the police had some motive in detaining were charged with violation
of the ordinance. Out of these 36, 12 were fined, 13 were given jail
sentences of from 5 to 60 days which were suspended "on good behavior"
or "on condition subject leave town," and 10 were discharged."' 5
A pattern of intentional selective application was not discovered in
Philadelphia, although that seems to be the tendency. There appeared
to be a greater chance that an individual in violation of the ordinance
whom the police desired to detain, incarcerate or harass would be charged
with a violation than an individual who, although in violation, was not
presently obnoxious to the investigating official. This result is also con-
firmed by the attitude enunciated by many officers that they see no reason
to charge an "otherwise law-abiding" individual with a violation. Some
of the cases found in Philadelphia which reflected selective prosecution
were as follows. A uniformed police officer lodged a charge of violating
the ordinance against an individual who had come to the police station
169. Attention is called to the relatively low number of registrations and prose-
cutions in the following localities: Canton, Ohio; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Louis-
ville, Kentucky; Rochester, Minnesota; and Santa Ana, California. See Appendices
C and D infra.
170. See Appendix D infra.
171. See Appendix C infra.
172. See Appendices C and D infra.
173. See text at note 23 and note 23 supra.
174. However, a letter from Lt. Bruce Simmons, Supervisor of the Miami
Beach Identification Bureau (Dec. 23, 1953), indicates that they do either prose-
cute or notify persons whose violation has been discovered from the workers' regis-
tration ordinance. Lt. Simmons stated that there were over 26,000 civilians regis-
tered during 1953 and usually 4% of civilian registrants have been convicted of a
felony. However, only a felony conviction within ten years of entrance into the
city raises criminal registration liability, and the high number of civilian regis-
trations is misleading in that every worker must re-register each year.
175. The disposition of one charge was not given.
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inquiring about a girl who had been arrested as a narcotic user. Suspect-
ing that this individual was also a "user," the officer questioned him con-
cerning his prior criminal record. The individual stated that he had a.
criminal record but was not registered, and, therefore, a charge was lodged
against him. 70 In one case a tramp was charged with violation of the ordi-
nance after he had been brought to the station house by a uniformed police
officer for "answering back" when told "to move on." The detective stated
that he charged the tramp with violating the ordinance after he had ad-
mitted during questioning that he had been convicted of burglary in New
Orleans but had not registered. The charge was lodged because the de-
tective wanted to "make it rough on the guy" even though he would be
discharged in the morning. In another case the individual was apprehended
in a tavern after having boasted to others that he was a well-known hench-
man of Willie Sutton, then currently the object of a police dragnet. Ac-
cording to the investigating detective, the individual was arrogant, ob-
noxious, and a self-admitted "cop-hater," which was "enough reason to
get this guy on something." The most obvious case of selective prose-
cution involved the arrest of two known professional thieves. Both of
these individuals had prior records of at least eleven arrests involving
either larcency, robbery, or burglary in as many jurisdictions. Upon in-
formation that these individuals were responsible for a recent epidemic
of pickpocketing at the baseball stadium the police arrested them while
peacefully occupying their hotel room. The investigators, unable to sus-
tain the pickpocket charge, charged the suspects with being professional
thieves, and with violating the criminal registration ordinance. Both
charges were dismissed when the magistrate sustained the argument of the
suspects' attorney that the invasion of the hotel room to make an arrest
without a warrant was a gross violation of the suspects' civil rights.
On the other hand, many detectives state that they lodge charges of
violation of the ordinance regardless of their feeling toward the particular
individual or their attitude toward the ordinance. They believe that it is
their duty to charge all persons who may be guilty and to allow the
magistrate, in the proper case, to suspend sentence or discharge the indi-
vidual. Thus, in a case involving a robbery charge against a person who
bad previously been convicted of statutory rape, a Philadelphia detective
also lodged a charge of violating the criminal registration ordinance,
even though, because of his belief that the person was innocent of the
robbery charge, the detective had spent five hours trying to break down
the complainant's identification upon which that charge was based. One
sergeant, who was in favor of the ordinance, stated that he found it par-
ticularly valuable in the case of drug addicts since such individuals are
dangerous and it is the duty of a police officer to use any available tech-
nique to keep them off the streets.
176. But strangely enough, an answer that the person is not a criminal wilt
not result in any further investigation to determine the validity of the answer.
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Prosecution Based on Information Obtained from Workers' Registra-
tion Ordinance: Some localities have both a criminal registration ordinance
and a "workers' registration ordinance." 177 Since most employers in
these localities will not hire anyone without a workers' registration card,
most persons will be forced to register under the workers' registration
ordinance in order to obtain employment. After a person has registered
under this ordinance, his fingerprints are taken and a copy is sent to the
FBI which returns any record that it might have on this individual to the
local police. The police use this information to determine whether the
individual had a prior criminal record which would require him to reg-
ister under its criminal registration ordinance. If the individual is under
the liability to register, the criminal registration file will indicate whether
he has violated the ordinance by having failed to register. The Assistant
City Attorney of Las Vegas, Nevada, reported that he knew of no case
during the last two and one-half years in which anyone had been charged
with violating the criminal registration ordinance as a result of infor-
mation obtained from its workers' registration ordinance; 178 but the Miami
Beach, Florida, police stated that information for approximately 65% of
the charges of violating its criminal registration ordinance was obtained
from the workers' registration data.17 9 Atlantic City, New Jersey, which
recently enacted a "transient workers' " registration ordinance, appears
to follow a policy similar to that of Miami Beach. 80
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CAsEs ARISING UNDER THE ORDINANCES
Disposition of the Violation Charges by Philadelphia'"' Magistrates
Of the 69 cases in which charges of violating the criminal registration
ordinance were lodged, in 48 the individuals were discharged and in 21
they were convicted and fined. In 17 of these 21 cases it appears that
177. E.g., Atlantic City, New Jersey; Miami Beach, Florida; and Las Vegas,
Nevada.
178. Letter from Ralston 0. Hawkins, Assistant City Attorney, Las Vegas,
Nevada (Dec. 8, 1953).
179. Letter from Lt. Bruce Simmons, Supervisor of the Identification Bueau,
Miami Beach, Florida (Dec. 23, 1953).
180. A recent newspaper article stated: "A city ordinance requiring the regis-
tration of all transient workers in this resort city [Atlantic City, New Jersey] has
led thus far to the arrest of 21 undesirables, acting Detective Capt. James H.
Farley, announced today.
"The ordinance, in operation since June 16 [1953] was enacted to impede the
activities of hoodlums, drifters, and drug addicts. It has led to the fingerprinting
and photographing of more than 5,000 migratory employees.
"The effectiveness of the measure is strengthened by a criminal registration
ordinance . . . and by a state law making it mandatory for any person convicted of
a narcotics offense to report to local authorities.
"The Drive netted two men who were still on 'wanted' lists." Philadephia
Inquirer, Aug. 2, 1953, § B, p. 3, col. 4.
181. The available information on the disposition of violation charges by the
lower judiciary in other localities is given in Appendix D infra.
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the persons involved were in actual violation.18 2  The individuals in the
other 4 cases in this group did not appear to be in violation, because in
2 cases the prior record was not such as to require registration, and in
the other 2 cases the individuals apparently had registered.
tm
Of the 48 cases in which the individuals were discharged, in 20 the
persons involved did not appear to be in violation while in 28, they did.1
8 4
Of the 20 cases in which the persons did not appear to be in violation, 9
involved persons who had previously registered, while in 11 the indi-
viduals did not seem to have a prior record which would have required
them to register.
These figures indicate that the chance of being improperly convicted
is slight in comparison to the chance of being discharged even though in
violation. Only 19% (4 out of 21) of the convictions appeared to be
improper. But 58.3% (28 out of 48) of those discharged appeared to
be in violation. These figures also tend to substantiate the claim of many
detectives that the magistrates usually dismiss the charges.
Litigation of the Ordinances Above the Magisterial Level
Apparently, there has been little litigation of the criminal registration
ordinances above the level of the magistrates' courts. Three cases were
found in which convictions under the Los Angeles, California, ordinance
were declared invalid. In one case 185 a conviction for failure to reregister
under the Los Angeles ordinance following a change of residence was
held invalid because the complaint failed to allege a prior conviction. In
another case18 6 the conviction was invalidated because the prosecution had
not presented evidence that any of the prior offenses which were com-
mitted in Oklahoma "would have been punishable as a felony" if com-
mitted in California. In the third case 'S 7 the conviction was reversed on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant
resided in the city or remained there for twenty-four hours. This opinion
is of particular interest since the court criticized the ordinance for its
lack of clarity, particularly in its definition of "convicted person."
182. In 6 of these 17 cases the individuals were also held on other charges, in
4 they were discharged on the other charges, and in 7 no other charges were made.
183. In each of these 4 cases other charges were lodged but in only 2 were the
individuals also held on the other charges.
184. In 12 of these 28 cases the individuals were held on other charges, in 14
the persons were discharged on all charges, in 1 the individual was fined on a
charge of disorderly conduct, and in 1 the individual was turned over to military
authorities.
185. In re Guy Diguiro, 100 Cal. App.2d 260, 223 P.2d 263, rehearing denied,
100 Cal. App.2d 260, 223 P.2d 873 (1950).
186. People v. James A. Pitt, Crim. Appeals No. 2777, Sept. 20, 1951. Since
the prior criminal record of the defendant indicated that he had been convicted of
such offenses, this reversal probably resulted because of the laxity of the prosecution.
187. People v. William J. Shirley, Crim. Appeals No. 1605, Los Angeles County
Sup. Ct, Dec. 21, 1939.
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Communications from other localities indicate that some litigation, in
addition to the three cases discussed above, has taken place. Although
habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in 1949 in order to contest
the Reno, Nevada, ordinance, the action was dropped at the request of
the defendant after the trial court had denied the petition. 88 The West
Palm Beach, Florida, ordinance was declared invalid a number of years
ago by the municipal court, but it was impossible to obtain further infor-
mation concerning this case. 8 9
The primary reason for the lack of litigation in this area probably is
that many of the individuals who are convicted under the ordinances can-
not afford legal representation. 190 In addition, an appeal would not be
prosecuted in most cases, since the penalties imposed by the courts are
very light.
EVALUATION
An evaluation of the criminal registration ordinances must consider
both their social desirability and constitutionality, and since these two
factors are interrelated, they will be discussed together. The social de-
sirability of these laws will be determined by considering their objectives,
the possibility of achieving those objectives, the possible restrictions upon
the liberties of the persons affected, and the abuses to which these laws
may and do lend themselves. These same factors are also relevant to
the constitutional questions. Of course, these laws may be constitutionally
valid, but undesirable in terms of social policy. Since the constitutionality
of any particular ordinance depends upon its specific provisions, as litigated
within the context of a specific factual situation, only the general consti-
tutional grounds for attacking these laws will be dealt with here.' 91
The stated objective of the criminal registration laws is to aid the
police in preventing criminal activities and apprehending the perpetrators
thereof. 92 The social desirability of such an objective cannot be criticized,
and compulsory registration of criminally dangerous persons would appear
to fall within the police power of the states.'93 The Supreme Court of
188. Letter from Martin J. Scanlan, attorney for the defendant (Dec. 7, 1953).
189. Letter from C. Robert Burns, City Attorney, West Palm Beach, Florida
(Nov. 10, 1953).
190. In Philadelphia a majority of the persons who were convicted of violating
the ordinance and were not being held for court on another charge were committed
to jail upon failure to pay the $100 fine. In Phoenix, Arizona, a large number of
persons were sent to prison for failure to pay relatively small fines. See Appendix
D infra.
191. For a study of the constitutionality of the Philadelphia criminal registration
'ordinance, see Note, 11 TEmp. L.Q. 551 (1937). Though not discussed here, it must
be remembered that individual ordinances are subject to attack under the various
state constitutions, as well as the Federal Constitution.
192. See text following note 3 and text at note 20 et seq. supra.
193. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (upholding legislation which was
directed toward unmasking the Ku Klux Klan by requiring the identification of
membership by certain organizations having an oath as a prerequisite or condition
of membership). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) ("Without
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the United States has upheld some statutes which have imposed a regis-
tration and identification requirement upon persons who were thought to
present a particular danger to the community. 194  The privileges and
immunities, due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, limit the states' police power in that the protection
of society by state action must not unduly infringe upon individual liberties.
Limitations unon an individual's freedom of locomotion have been
subjected to the test of the privileges and immunities and the due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 95  Although the criminal regis-
doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a
stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any
purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he
purports to represent.").
194. See note 193 supra. Compare also City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d
661 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941) (upholding a city ordinance which
required the registration and identification of persons who work as bootblacks or
sell magazines, pamphlets and newspapers in the streets) ; United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612 (1954) (upholding the constitutionality, inter alia, of statutory pro-
visions for the registration of lobbyists) ; United States v. Peace Information Center,
97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951) (upholding the cqnstitutionality of the Foreign Agent's
Registration Act, 52 STAT. 631 (1939), as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§611-21 (Supp.
1950)). But cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 71 n.3 (1941) (see text at note
100, supra). See Allutson v. Mallard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (up-
holding Michigan statute requiring Communists to register with the State police).
195. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U.S. 1867); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S.
270, 274 (1900) (the Court, although holding that a state law taxing persons
hiring laborers to work elsewhere did not abridge the privileges and immunities
clause did state: "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from
one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and
the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is
a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the
Constitution.") ; Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931). See
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584, 44 N.W. 579, 582 (1889) ; Commonwealth
v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 167 Atl. 241, 242 (1933); Ex parte Hudgins, 86
W. Va. 526, 529, 103 S.E. 327, 329 (1920); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp., 445,
451 (D.D.C. 1952) ("Thus, freedom to travel abroad, like other rights, is subject
to reasonable regulation and control in the interest of the public welfare. How-
ever, the Constitution [Fifth Amendment] requires due process and equal protection
of the laws in the exercise of that control."). See also Meyers, Federal Privileges
and Immtunities: Application to Ingress and Egress, 29 COR1NELL L.Q. 489 (1944).
In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941), where a state statute
making it a misdemeanor to bring or assist in bringing an indigent person into
the state was declared invalid, four justices, in two concurring opinions, based their
conclusion on the privileges and immunities clause. Justice Douglas' opinion, which
was joined by Justices Black and Murphy, stated: "The conclusion that the right
of free movement is a right of national citizenship stands on firm historical
ground . . . a state statute which obstructs or in substance prevents the movement
must fall. That result necessarily follows unless perchance a State can curtail the
right of free movement of those who are poor or destitute. But to allow such an
exception to be engrafted on the rights of national citizenship would be to contra-
vene every conception of national unity. It would also introduce a caste system
utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system of government. It would permit
those who were stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to be
relegated to an inferior class of citizenship. It would prevent a citizen because he
was poor from seeking new horizons in other States. It might thus withhold from
large segments of our people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of
freedom of opportunity." Id. at 181. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, though
more limited, was of the same tenor. He stated: "The right of the citizen to migrate
from state to state . . . shown by our precedents to be one of national citizenship,
1954]
98 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
tration ordinances do not completely limit an individual's right of locomo-
tion, they do impose a rather heavy burden upon the individuals subject
to them. 198 The burden is directly proportional to the freedom of locomo-
tion which the individual must have in his everyday life. For example,
a convicted person who either desires to travel for pleasure or is required
to travel by his employer might well abandon his activity because of the
burdens of the ordinances; for, regardless of the seriousness or temporal
remoteness '97 of the crime for which he was convicted, such an individual
must take the time, trouble and expense to determine if each locality has
an ordinance and if he falls within its terms, and then he must comply
with the requirements of those ordinances which affect him. In addition,
under most of the ordinances, every subsequent entry into, or change of
address in, that locality would require a notification to the police. 98  Since
these ordinances infringe upon the right of locomotion, which is a national
right protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is necessary to determine whether a legislature has a suffi-
cient basis under the due process clause to restrict this right.
Substantive due process requires that there be a relationship between
the objective sought to be attained and the means employed to achieve
that end. The standard that governs the relationship between means and
end depends upon the character of the rights involved.' 99 Restriction
on the "indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amend-
ment . . . must have clear support in public danger, actual or impend-
ing" 200 whereas economic rights require that there be a "substantial rela-
tionship" between the means and end.2 01  The present case lies between
is not, however, an unlimited one . . . such citizen is subject to some control by
state governments . . . it is here that we meet the real crux of this case. Does
'indigent' as defined . . . constitute a basis for restricting the freedom of a citizen,
as crime (i.e. a fugitive from justice) or contagion warrants its restriction? We
should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere property status,
without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as
a citizen of the United States." Id. at 184.
196. See text following notes 81 and 150 supra.
197. See text at note 37 et seq. and text at and following note 69 supra.
198. See text following note 89 supra.
199. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the Court stated: "... it
is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard
governs the choice." Id. at 530.
The means adopted to obtain the end do not, however, have to be the best avail-
able. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Court stated: "It is
no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which one of two modes
was likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public. . . . [T]hat
was for the legislative department to determine in the light of all the information
it had or could obtain." Id. at 30.
200. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). The Court also stated that
where First Amendment rights are involved: "The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support
legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest
on firmer foundation." Ibid.
201. E.g., Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950). In this case the Court stated: "Like any other legislation, a price-fixing
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these two extremes. The liberty protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment has not been interpreted as including all of
the rights protected by the first eight amendments of the Constitution,
20 2
nor has the scope of the meaning of "liberty" been precisely defined, but it
surely includes more than exemption from physical restraint. The First
Amendment rights have all been read into the concept of liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment because of their importance to the very existence
of a democratic system of government. How far the concept of liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment will extend is uncertain. The philosophy
of any democratic system would seem to require, in addition to the First
Amendment rights, that the integrity of the person be protected; that each
individual be free from a constant atmosphere of police surveillance; that
each individual be free from legislation which is an inherent vehicle for
potential abuse; and that the freedom of locomotion, discussed above, be
preserved. In short, the liberty involved here is that which distinguishes
a democracy from the state police system of a dictatorial regime.^°3 Be-
cause these rights are so important in maintaining a democratic system,
they should be included within the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the standard for scrutinizing the relationship between
means and end should be closer to that involved in the First Amendment
cases rather than that involved in the economic regulation cases.
The relationship between means and end will depend upon whether
registration and identification of convicted persons enables the community
to protect itself from a genuine evil or danger; and this in turn will de-
pend upon whether these persons actually present such an evil or danger,
and whether the persons charged with enforcing these laws deliberately
fail to enforce them so that they may be utilized for purposes other than
the stated objective, or, if they are enforced and the persons have regis-
tered, whether the information thus obtained is available to and used by
the police. The most difficult and also the most significant factor in
determining the social desirability and constitutionality of these laws is
whether convicted persons present a sufficient danger to the community
to warrant the imposition of the registration requirements. In the regis-
tration laws upheld by the Supreme Court, the registration liability was
imposed on individuals who were presently engaged in activity that could
be considered dangerous.204 The criminal registration laws, on the other
order is lawful if substantially related to a legitimate end sought to be attained.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and cases therein cited." Id. at 186.
Dicta in cases subsequent to Nebbia v. New York had indicated that the standard
of relationship between means and end in economic cases was that there be only a
"rational basis." See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 527 (1945).
202. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
203. See Kempner, supra note 22, for a discussion of the thoroughness of the
Nazi regime in its control of the German people.
204. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (identification of membership
at time of enactment and periodically thereafter). See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
210 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (registration required prior to solicitation of funds).
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hand, do not require registration because the individuals are presently
engaged in dangerous activity, but because they have engaged in anti-social
behavior in the past. The theory of the criminal registration laws, there-
fore, must of necessity rest upon the assumption that persons who have
once been convicted of a crime are sufficiently dangerous to warrant the
imposition of the registration burden for the protection of the community.
Any evaluation of the criminal registration laws is dependent upon the
validity of this assumption. The available statistical information con-
cerning recidivism is not very useful in evaluating the quantitative proba-
bility that an individual with a particular pattern of prior criminalty is
more likely to engage in anti-social behavior than individuals without such
a prior history.?0 5 Although criminologists and sociologists have studied
the problem of recidivism and have come forth with conflicting views as
to the likelihood that convicted persons will recidivate, 20 6 none have been
able to state with any degree of assurance that the one factor, i.e., having
previously been convicted of a single crime, is a sufficient criteria for
predicting future criminality.20 7  The research in the area of parole and
probation relapse prediction has aptly demonstrated that many factors are
See also, United States v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C.
1951) (persons engaged in dispensing foreign propaganda at time report required) ;
United States v. Harriss, 74 Sup. Ct. 808 (1954) (persons engaged in lobbying
at time report required).
205. For a comprehensive survey of the studies that had been made up to 1932 on
the problem of recidivism see MICHAEL AND ADLER, AN INSTIUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY
AND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 123-77 (1932) (Report of a Survey Conducted for the
Bureau of Social Hygiene under the Auspices of the School of Law of Columbia
University).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports are of some
value in that they do report the number of persons who have been arrested for
particular offinses during a particular year who had, at the time of such arrest,
prior arrest fingerprint records on file with the FBI. Unfortunately this statistical
material is based upon arrests rather than convictions and thus can be somewhat
deceptive. The mere fact that an individual has a prior arrest or conviction will
make it more likely that he will be arrested in the future, but there may not be
sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction or, in many cases, even a holding over
on preliminary examination. See HoPKINs, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 88 et seq. (1931).
See also text at note 213 and note 213 infra.
206. See note 205 supra.
207. In fact, the conclusions drawn by MICHAEL AND ADLER, Op. Cit. supra
note 205, after reviewing the various studies in recidivism were as follows: "Our
critical appraisal of the researches reported in the preceding section can be succinctly
summarized in the following statement: These researches do not afford a single
definite and clearly valid answer to any of the foregoing questiom. We do not know
whether criminals can or cannot be differentiated from non-criminals in terms of
any set of factors. We do not know whether classes of individuals whose offenses
are different in terms of the criminal law can be differentiated from one another.
We are similarly ignorant with respect to each of the other questions. Unless it is
unfair to say that it was the purpose of the researches summarized to answer
questions of this sort, it cannot be thought an unjust evaluation of them to say
that they have failed utterly to accomplish the purpose for which they were under-
taken. All of the investigations which have been conducted not only have not
advanced our knowledge of the causes of criminal behavior, but what is worse, they
have not yielded conclusions relevant to the only specific problems by which they
can conceivably have been directed. The knowledge which has been accumulated
by so much industry and effort not only lacks etiological significance but is incon-
clusive in its own terms." Id. at 178.
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relevant. 208  Unlike the habitual criminal laws which require a fait ac-
compli before the habitual criminal penalty is imposed, the vast majority
of the criminal registration ordinances require merely one conviction and
impose the registration burden without any indication of future criminal
tendency.20 9  In view of the lack of any definite knowledge as to whether
the mere fact that persons who have once been convicted of a crime are
significantly more dangerous to the public safety than the general popula-
tion, it is questionable whether there is a sufficient relationship between
the registration requirement and the objective of these laws under the
standard set forth above.
Although analysis of available statistics 210 may lead to the conclusion
that a person with a particular pattern of criminality is more likely to
become involved in future criminal activity than a person without such
a prior record, the failure to discriminate more sharply in the types of
crime included within the scope of the ordinances 211 and the time within
which the criminality must have occurred 212 also tends to show a lack
of substantial relationship between means and end. There is some rela-
tionship between the character of a prior criminal act and the likelihood
of recidivism, 213 but the indiscriminate inclusion of "any crime," 214 "any
208. See discussion of various studies in Allen, A Reveiw of Parole Prediction
Literature, 32 J. Ci. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 548 (1942) ; Monachesi, American Studies
in the Prediction of Recidivism, 41 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 268 (1951) ; Mic31AEL
AND ADLER, AN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 124 et seq.
(1932). See also Glueck, Pre-Sentence Examination of Offenders to Aid in Choosing
a Method of Treatmeint, 41 J. Calm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1951).
209. None of the ordinances provide for a finding that any particular individual
constitutes a danger to the community or that he demonstrates a tendency toward
criminality. The failure to provide for such a finding may raise a procedural due
process question. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Chief Justice
Stone, in a concurring opinion, stated: "A law which condemns, without hearing, all
the individuals of a class to so harsh a measure as the present [sterilization]
because some or even many merit condemnation, is lacking in the first principles
of due process." Id. at 545. Although criminal registration laws do not involve
such a "harsh" measure as was present in the Skinner case, nevertheless, the same
principle can be applied. Compare the procedural requirements upheld in Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1927).
210. Sellin, The Criminal History of Released Prisoners, 35 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 223 (1944). See generally the Uniform Crime Reports published
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Zuckerman, Barron, & Whittier, A Follow-
Up Study of Minnesota State Reformatory Inmates-A Prelinahry Report, 43
J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 622 (1952).
211. See text at note 37 et seq. sitpra.
212. See text at note 69 and text following note 73 stupra. A study of 345 in-
dividuals released from the Minnesota State Reformatory during 1944 and 1945 re-
vealed that of those releasees who recidivated during the seven year period following
release, only 2.3%o did so for the first time during the the last two years covered
by the study. Zuckerman, Barron, & Whittier, sipra note 210, at 626.
213. Although the statistics available are of very little use for the purposes of
this study, an analysis of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Re-
ports for the years 1938 to 1946 inclusive discloses that there is a significantly
greater chance that a person arrested for narcotic offenses, vagrancy, drunkenness,
forgery, counterfeiting, or robbery will have had a prior arrest than one arrested
for arson, sex offenses, homicide, or driving while intoxicated. Calculations based
upon statistical matter found in Volume XI of the Uniform Crime -Reports discloses
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felony," 215 or "crimes involving moral turpitude" 216 in the terms of the
ordinances clearly demonstrates the failure to give this factor any con-
sideration. The choice of crimes included in many of the ordinances often
appears illogical and arbitrary when considered with respect to the stated
objective.2 17  The same may be said in reference to the time when the
prior conviction must have occurred.2 1 s  In regard to persons who have
demonstrated their rehabilitation, only those who enter the jurisdiction
after a certain period are exempted from the ordinance.219 It seems irra-
tional that registered persons, after rehabilitation, must be subjected to the
burdens for the rest of their lives, while individuals entering the juris-
diction after a certain period are completely exempted. Surely, the danger
to the community cannot be predicated upon the mere fortuitous circum-
stance of when an individual first enters the jurisdiction.
But even assuming that the theory of these ordinances is valid and
that they were drafted to reflect the considerations stated above, the actual
practices show that the theory is merely the facade for police harassment
of individuals who have been convicted of a crime 220 This study has
indicated that in some jurisdictions the number of persons registering
is substantial,2 2 ' while in others a definite policy of non-publicity and non-
enforcement appears to be followed.2 2  In fact, one authoritative source
stated that the strength of these laws lies in the fact that persons required
to register will not do so.2a However, the ordinances also provide a
the following data with respect to the number of persons arrested for specific offenses
in 1940 who had records of prior convictions for similar offenses.
Per Cent of Persons
Arrested Who Had
Offense Similar Prior Convictions
Narcotic Offenses 20.0
Burglary 10.9
Larceny 10.4
Forgery & Counterfeiting 10.4
Embezzlement & Fraud 8.3
Auto Theft 5.6
Driving While Intoxicated 5.0
Rape 1.3
Homicide 0.8
214. See text preceding note 39 supra.
215. See text at note 39 and note 39 supra.
216. See text at note 40 and note 40 supra.
217. E.g., see text following note 41 supra.
218. See text at note 69 et seq. supra.
219. Ibid.
220. See text at notes 15 and 169 et seq. supra. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399-400 (1923), the Court stated: "The established doctrine is that this liberty
[under due process] may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable rela-
tion to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect [personal liberty]."
See also Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928) (economic regulation).
But cf. Daniel v. Family Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 (1949) (economic regu-
lation).
221. See Appendix C infra.
222. See Appendix C infra; see text at notes 19, 133 et seq. supra.
223. See note 17 supra.
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method for possible police harassment of registered persons.224  It is
questionable whether the registration of these persons, even where a
substantial number have registered, materially aids the police in preventing
criminality or apprehending criminals. The practices observed lead to
the conclusion that the registration data is rarely used by the police.22
5
In Philadelphia, the general practice of the police is to place the data in
regular police criminal identification files. Although the fingerprints are
classified and are available for comparison with prints at the scene of a
crime, the police can probably make a quicker check by forwarding the
prints to the FBI, since any prints obtained by the local police through
registration would also be on file with the FBI.2 6 The criminal regis-
tration laws do enable the police to secure a recent photograph of per-
sons in the locality,227 and the police can use this to identify persons
who have been engaged in criminal acts. This is probably the greatest
and most useful attribute of the criminal registration laws, but it is doubt-
ful whether this attribute is sufficient, in view of the other considerations,
to hold these laws either socially desirable or constitutional. This study
has shown that in a large city the registration information may get lost
in the mass of police records and that no attempt is made to advise the
law enforcement officials who will come in contact with the registrant
that they are to keep a particularly close watch on him because of his
prior criminal record; however, it is quite possible, especially in smaller
towns, that the fact that a person with a prior criminal record is in the
locality would be spread rapidly to the entire police force, and indeed,
the registrant might well be singled out for "special treatment." The
social desirability of such special observation and treatment is a matter of
opinion. Police claim that these ordinances provide them with informa-
tion as to where and for whom to look when there is trouble, and further
that a person who knows that he is being observed will keep out of trouble.
To a certain degree the latter is the theory upon which parole and proba-
tion are based. But it is equally true that police knowledge of a prior
criminal record can result in constant harassment of an individual when-
224. Compare text at note 163 et seq. supra with text at note 169 et seq. supra.
225. See text at note 155 et seq. supra.
226. See text at note 154 et seq. supra.
227. Many police departments in communications to the Law Review considered
this aspect of the ordinance particularly important. One department (Allentown)
enclosed a photograph of a registrant at the time of his registration after release
from prison (Age 25) and a photograph taken 5/2 years previously at the time of
his arrest. A comparison of the photographs revealed that it is quite possible that
someone could identify the individual by the later photograph and not by the
former. The Philadelphia police have recently begun taking palm prints of regis-
trants who have a prior record involving burglary, robbery, and similar crimes.
These prints can be useful for identification of prints found at the scene of a crime.
Prior to the 1936 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia the Phila-
delphia police with cooperation from police departments all over the country, made
up a thirteen volume album of 10,000 photos of pickpockets, hotel thieves, confidence
men, gamblers and other known criminals to be used by the police in identifying
undesirables. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1936, p. 2, col. 4. Several hundred of these
photographs were shown to hotel detectives and floor managers prior to the conven-
tion. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1936, p. 8, col. 4.
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ever any criminal act occurs in the locality. Such harassment usually will
result in a great number of arrests without sufficient probable cause.2 s
In view of the fact that access to the registration information is not restricted
in some instances,229 this type of harassment may be carried over into areas
where the individual's opportunity to secure employment would be seriously
hampered.
In other jurisdictions the possible benefit that might be derived from
a person's registration is sacrificed by following a policy of not publicizing
the existence of these ordinances and not encouraging persons to register.2 0
The fact that the police can arrest an individual for failure to comply
with the ordinance permits, them to detain him on "suspicion" for pur-
poses of investigation with respect to a more serious crime for which they
have no evidence to hold him.231 Local authorities also use the ordinance
to expel "undesirables" from the jurisdiction by suspending sentence upon
condition that they leave town.232  It has also been stated that the ordi-
nances are used to force cooperation from individuals who have failed to
register by threatening prosecution for violating the ordinances.2  Per-
sons unadvised of the existence of such ordinances may become, in effect,
"police bait." They may be incarcerated whenever the police feel that
they should be kept off the streets. The pattern of selective prosecution
which was discerned in some communities enables local authorities to use
the ordinances as an additional effective harassing weapon.23 4 It is sig-
nificant that none of the ordinances require a "willful" failure to register
to constitute a violation.2 3 5 If the purpose of these ordinances is to secure
228. One symptom of this "special treatment" is the periodic mass arrest of
known criminals engaged in by some police departments, possibly for the political
purpose of informing the citizens that something is being done about crime. For
example, immediately prior to the 1936 National Convention of the Democratic
Party in Philadelphia, Philadelphia's Mayor Wilson ordered Superintendent of
Police Malone to arrest every known criminal in the city. N.Y. Times, June 17,
1936, p. 2, col. 4.
The police practice of "round-ups" is too well known to need further discussion.
229. See text at note 121 et seq. supra.
230. See text following note 133 supra.
231. See text following note 166 supra and text at note 175 et seq. supra.
232. See Appendix D infra and text at 170 et seq. supra.
The constitutionality of this sort of banishment is open to question. It has
been held contrary to public policy to permit one state to "dump" their undesirables
on another. See, e.g., People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930). In
In re Scarborough, 76 Cal. App.2d 648, 650, 173 P.2d 825, 827 (1946) it was stated
that the "[s]ame principle which prohibits the banishment of a criminal from a
state or from the United States applies with equal force to a county or city." See
also, Comment, 31 MINN. L. Rav. 742 (1947).
233. A few Philadephia detectives stated that they had employed this method of
obtaining information from uncooperative individuals. The threat of prosecution is
made more effective by exaggerating to an individual the available penalties under
the ordinance.
234. See text following note 169 supra.
235. Compare the Alien Registration Act, 66 STAT. 225 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1306
(1952) ("Any alien required to apply for registration . . . who willfully fails or
refuses to make such application . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. .. .")
(italics added), and the Universal Military Training Act, 62 STAT. 622 (1948),
50 U.S.C. App. §462 (1952) (knowingly fail to register). See also 86 CONG.
REc. 8346 (1940) (Senate discussion of meaning of willful in Alien Registration
Act).
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the registration and identification of criminally dangerous persons, the
penalty should only be severe enough to insure compliance with the
registration provision, and should be imposed only against those who will-
fully fail to register; also, there should be provisions for publicizing the
existence of registration obligations. The failure to incorporate such pro-
visions tends to prove that the stated objective is merely a verbal justifica-
tion, while the true objective is to provide the police with a weapon to
harass individuals simply because they have been previously convicted
of a crime.
The use of these ordinances to harass selective cases as the whims of
the police dictate, raises a serious constitutional question. In 1886 the
Supreme Court of the United States declared that even though a law is
not discriminatory upon its face, if the evidence of practices under that
law indicates a history of discriminatory application, the law violates equal
protection.P 6 Applying this test to the criminal registration laws there
is a great probability that this situation prevails. 7 The constant use of
the ordinances to prosecute those in violation would, in itself, be an adver-
tisement of their existence and tend to destroy their effectiveness as a
harassment weapon.
This Note has not attempted to point out all the factors involved in
determining the question of social desirability or to point out all the con-
stitutional questions. Enough has been said, however, to raise serious
doubts on both scores. Other questions of social desirability are also pres-
ent in these laws, such as their effect upon those individuals sincerely at-
tempting to rehabilitate themselves and to be accepted back into society
as useful members. Having ostensibly paid their debt to society for their
prior crime, is it socially desirable to stigmatize these individuals further
with marks of their past errors by requiring them to carry criminal regis-
tration cards and to report all subsequent changes of address to the police?
Likewise, other constitutional objections may be inherent in these laws.
For example, a question of vagueness and indefiniteness may be involved
in some of these ordinances, both in terms of who are included and for
what duration.2 s  In addition, some of these ordinances may be inflict-
ing an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce.239  The possi-
bility cannot be overlooked that even though no one aspect may render
236. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
237. See text at notes 166-80 supra.
238. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Winters v. New
York, 331 U.S. 507 (1948). The vagueness of the statutes is exemplified in the
text preceding note 36 and the text at notes 50 and 74 supra. See also text follow-
ing note 187 siLra.
239. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); note 195 supra. For
example, under the newly-proposed Camden, New Jersey ordinance, which
requires registration immediately upon entering the city, an individual could not
even pass through the city on a public carrier without interrupting his journey to
register. See note 76 supra.
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these ordinances unconstitutional under the due process clause, invalida-
tion may result because the basic principles, content, and administration
of these ordinances combine to offend against "a sense of justice" inherent
in American democracy. 240 The imposition of the registration require-
ments upon persons merely because they have been convicted of a single
"crime," the fact that persons in some cases are subjected to the registra-
tion requirements for the rest of their lives, and especially the manner in
which these laws are used leads to the conclusion that these ordinances
are socially undesirable and of questionable constitutionality.
240. This test of constitutionality has been enunciated recently by the Supreme
Court. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court struck down a
conviction for violating a state law forbidding possession of morphine where evidence
was obtained by the forcible use of a stomach pump on the defendant. The basis
of the majority opinion was that due process of law will not allow any conviction
"brought about by methods that offend a 'sense of justice."' Id. at 173. The Court
has also recognized that this principle applies to legislation. In Galdan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), the validity of Section 22 of the Internal Security Act
of 1950, providing for the deportation of any alien who has been a member of the
Communist Party, was in issue. Sustaining the act under Congress' broad power
over aliens, the Court pointed out: "If due process bars Congress from enactments
that shock the sense of fair play-which is the essence of due process-one is en-
titled to ask whether it is not beyond the power of Congress to deport an alien
who was duped into joining the Communist Party ... " Id. at 530.
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APPENDIX A
DISTRIBUTION OF CITIES SURVEYED TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE ENACTED
CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCES: ACCORDING TO POPULATION Gours 1
Number
of Cities
in Group
Number
of Cities
Surveyed
Number and
Percentage
Responding
5 5 5 (100%)
13 13 13 (100%)
23 23 22 (96%)
65 65 47 ( 72%)
126 126 68 ( 54%)
252 1683 86 ( 51%)
778 5 5 (100%)
- 1 (100%)
Percentage
Number of Cities
Number Responding Surveyed
Responding Not Responding
Having Having Having
Enacted Enacted Enacted
Ordinances Ordinances Ordinances
2
2 3 40.0%
2 11 15A%
9 13 41.0%
11 36 23.4%
8 60 11.8%
11 75 12.8%
5 0 -
1 0 -
1. This survey was made between August, 1953 and March, 1954.
2. It has been impossible to determine whether a city having an
more or less likely to respond.
ordinance would be
3. A few cities in this group were surveyed as a result of information from other cities
indicating that they had ordinances.
4. The data for these groups is not statistically significant.
Population
Group-
1950 Census
Over 1
million
500,000 to
1 million
250,000 to
500,000
100,000 to
250,000
50,000 to
100,000
25,000 to
50,000
10,000 to 4
25,000
less than4
10,000
19541
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APPENDIX B
LOcALI.TiEs WHICH HAVE ENACTED ORDINANCES
Locality
Akron, Ohio
Allentown, Pa.
Arcadia, Cal.
Atlantic City, N. J.
*Beverly Hills, Cal.
Birmingham, Ala.
Camden, N. J.
Canton, Ohio
Cincinnati, Ohio
Collingswood, N. J.
Columbus, Ohio
Coral Gables, Fla.
Evansville, Ind.
Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
*Gadsden, Ala.
Harrisburg, Pa.
Hot Springs, Ark.
Jersey City, N. J.
Lakeland, Fla.
Lakewood, N. J.
Las Vegas, Nev.
Long Beach, Cal.
Lorain, Ohio
Los Angeles, Cal.
Louisville, Ky.
Date
1938
2/14/50
12/ 5/33
4/11135
6/14/34
3/26/52
6/4/45
4/21/52
12/19/33
1953
8/24/37
8/ 1/46
5/6/52
7/21/53
11/11/51
6/22145
4/16/51
9/12/33
7/14/37
Locality
Miami, Fla.
Miami Beach, Fla.
Norfolk, Va.
Pasadena, Cal.
Pensacola, Fla.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Phoenix, Ariz.
Reno, Nev.
Rochester, Minn.
St. Paul, Minn.
St. Petersburg, Fla.
San Diego, Cal.
*San Francisco, Cal.
San Jose, Cal.
*Santa Ana, Cal.
Seattle, Wash.
Shaker Heights, Ohio
South Gate, Cal.
*South St. Paul, Minn.
Springfield, Ohio
*Tampa, Fla.1
Trenton, N. J.
Tulsa, Okla.
*West Palm Beach, Fla.2
Date
9/2/36
11/17/33
11/25/48
3/16/37
3/8/48
2/15136
11/ 3/41
1/29/36
1/ 7/41
7/20/36
7/ 3145
9126133
11/14/43
1945
* Copies of ordinances not obtained from these cities.
1. Ordinance no longer in effect having expired of its own limitation.
2. Ordinance declared invalid by a municipal judge.
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APPENDIX E
CASES IN PHILADELPHIA IN WHICH A CRIMINAL REGISTRATION VIOLATION WAS
LODGED IN CONJUNCTION WITH SOME OTHER OFFENSE 1
Total cases in which persons were charged with violating ordinance ........... 692
Cases in which only charge was violation of ordinance ....................... 19
Cases in which violation of the ordinance was lodged in conjunction with some
other offense 3 ......................................................... 50
The Other Charges: 4
Larceny of Auto ...................................................... 7
Larceny other than of auto ............................................. 8
Burglary .............................................................. 6
Disorderly Conduct ................................................... 4
Loitering and Prowling ................................................ 6
Gambling, Lottery, etc ................................................. 2
Liquor Act violations ................................................ 2
A.W .O.L. from military service ........................................ 1
Attempted Breaking & Entering & Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapon ... 1
Assault and Battery & Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapon .............. 1
Assault and Battery ................................................... 1
Highway Robbery ..................................................... 1
Holdup and Robbery .................................................. 1
V agrancy ............................................................. 1
Rape, Sodomy, Assault & Battery, Larceny of Auto, Robbery, Leaving scene
of accident, No drivers license ..................................... 1
Firearms A ct ......................................................... 2
Professional Thief and Vagrancy ....................................... 2
Disorderly Conduct and Intoxication ................................... 1
Attempted Rape ....................................................... 1
Trespass .............................................................. 1
Total ................................................. 50
1. During the first nine months of 1953.
2. Only 68 persons were charged, one person being charged with a violation on
two different occasions.
3. In a few cases the suspect was charged with an offense apparently known as
"investigation," the existence of which can not be found in Pennsylvania law. There-
fore, such charges have not been included in this tabulation.
4. In most cases in which more than one charge was lodged only the most serious
one was listed.
